1After O
refitting O
their O
ships O
Gylippus O
and O
Pythen O
coasted O
along O
from O
Tarentum O
to O
Epizephyrian O
Locris. O
They O
now O
received O
the O
more O
correct O
information O
that O
Syracuse O
was O
not O
yet O
completely O
invested O
but O
that O
it O
was O
still O
possible O
for O
an O
army O
arriving O
at O
Epipolae O
to O
effect O
an O
entrance; O
and O
they O
consulted O
accordingly O
whether O
they O
should O
keep O
Sicily O
on B-LOC
their O
right O
and O
risk O
sailing O
in O
by O
sea O
or O
leaving O
it O
on O
their O
left O
should O
first O
sail O
to O
Himera O
and B-LOC
taking I-LOC
with O
them O
the O
Himeraeans O
and B-PER
any I-PER
others O
that O
might O
agree O
to O
join O
them O
go O
to O
Syracuse O
by B-LOC
land. I-LOC
Finally O
they O
determined O
to O
sail O
for O
Himera O
especially O
as O
the O
four O
Athenian O
ships O
which O
Nicias O
had O
at B-PER
length I-PER
sent O
off O
on O
hearing O
that O
they O
were O
at O
Locris O
had O
not B-LOC
yet I-LOC
arrived O
at O
Rhegium. O
Accordingly O
before O
these O
reached O
their O
post O
the O
Peloponnesians O
crossed O
the O
strait O
and O
after O
touching O
at O
Rhegium O
and O
Messina O
came B-LOC
to O
Himera. B-LOC
Arrived O
there B-LOC
they O
persuaded O
the O
Himeraeans O
to O
join O
in B-PER
the I-PER
war I-PER
and O
not O
only O
to O
go O
with O
them O
themselves O
but O
to O
provide O
arms O
for O
the O
seamen O
from O
their O
vessels O
which O
they O
had O
drawn O
ashore O
at O
Himera; O
and O
they O
sent O
and O
appointed O
a O
place O
for O
the O
Selinuntines O
to O
meet O
them O
with O
all O
their O
forces. O
A O
few O
troops O
were O
also O
promised O
by O
the O
Geloans O
and O
some O
of O
the O
Sicels O
who O
were O
now O
ready O
to O
join O
them O
with O
much O
greater O
alacrity O
owing O
to O
the O
recent O
death O
of O
Archonidas O
a O
powerful O
Sicel O
king O
in O
that O
neighbourhood O
and O
friendly O
to O
Athens O
and O
owing O
also O
to O
the O
vigour O
shown O
by O
Gylippus O
in O
coming O
from O
Lacedaemon. O
Gylippus O
now O
took O
with O
him O
about O
seven O
hundred O
of O
his O
sailors O
and O
marines O
that O
number O
only O
having O
arms O
a O
thousand O
heavy O
infantry O
and O
light O
troops O
from O
Himera O
with O
a O
body O
of O
a O
hundred B-LOC
horse O
some O
light O
troops O
and O
cavalry O
from O
Selinus O
a O
few O
Geloans O
and O
Sicels O
numbering O
a O
thousand O
in O
all O
and O
set O
out O
on O
his O
march O
for O
Syracuse. O
2Meanwhile O
the O
Corinthian O
fleet O
from O
Leucas O
made O
all O
haste O
to O
arrive; O
and O
one O
of O
their O
commanders O
Gongylus O
starting O
last O
with O
a O
single O
ship O
was O
the O
first O
to O
reach O
Syracuse O
a O
little O
before O
Gylippus. O
Gongylus O
found O
the O
Syracusans O
on O
the O
point O
of O
holding O
an O
assembly O
to O
consider O
whether O
they O
should O
put O
an O
end O
to O
the O
war. O
This O
he O
prevented O
and O
reassured O
them O
by O
telling O
them O
that O
more O
vessels O
were O
still O
to O
arrive O
and O
that O
Gylippus O
son O
of O
Cleandridas O
had O
been O
dispatched O
by O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
to O
take O
the O
command. O
Upon O
this O
the O
Syracusans O
took O
courage O
and O
immediately O
marched O
out O
with O
all O
their O
forces O
to O
meet O
Gylippus O
who O
they O
found O
was O
now O
close O
at O
hand. O
Meanwhile O
Gylippus O
after O
taking O
Ietae O
a O
fort O
of O
the O
Sicels O
on O
his O
way O
formed O
his O
army O
in O
order O
of O
battle O
and O
so O
arrived O
at O
Epipolae O
and O
ascending O
by O
Euryelus O
as O
the O
Athenians O
had O
done O
at O
first O
now O
advanced O
with O
the O
Syracusans O
against O
the O
Athenian O
lines. O
His O
arrival O
chanced O
at O
a O
critical O
moment. O
The O
Athenians O
had O
already O
finished O
a O
double O
wall O
of O
six O
or O
seven O
furlongs O
to O
the O
great O
harbour O
with O
the O
exception O
of O
a O
small O
portion O
next O
the O
sea O
which O
they O
were O
still O
engaged O
upon; O
and O
in O
the O
remainder O
of O
the O
circle O
towards O
Trogilus O
on O
the O
other O
sea O
stones O
had O
been O
laid O
ready O
for O
building O
for O
the O
greater O
part O
of O
the O
distance O
and O
some O
points O
had O
been O
left O
half O
finished O
while O
others O
were O
entirely O
completed. O
The O
danger O
of O
Syracuse O
had O
indeed O
been O
great. O
3Meanwhile O
the O
Athenians O
recovering B-LOC
from O
the O
confusion O
into O
which O
they O
had O
been O
first O
thrown O
by O
the O
sudden O
approach O
of O
Gylippus O
and O
the O
Syracusans O
formed O
in O
order O
of O
battle. O
Gylippus O
halted O
at O
a O
short O
distance O
off O
and O
sent O
on O
a O
herald O
to O
tell O
them O
that O
if O
they O
would O
evacuate O
Sicily O
with O
bag O
and O
baggage O
within O
five O
days' O
time O
he O
was B-LOC
willing I-LOC
to O
make O
a O
truce O
accordingly. O
The O
Athenians O
treated O
this O
proposition O
with O
contempt O
and O
dismissed O
the O
herald O
without O
an O
answer. O
After O
this O
both O
sides O
began O
to O
prepare O
for O
action. O
Gylippus O
observing O
that O
the O
Syracusans O
were O
in O
disorder O
and O
did O
not O
easily O
fall O
into O
line O
drew O
off O
his O
troops O
more O
into O
the O
open O
ground O
while O
Nicias O
did O
not O
lead O
on O
the O
Athenians O
but O
lay O
still O
by O
his O
own O
wall. B-PER
When O
Gylippus O
saw O
that O
they O
did O
not O
come O
on O
he O
led O
off O
his O
army O
to O
the O
citadel O
of O
the O
quarter O
of O
Apollo O
Temenites O
and O
passed O
the O
night O
there. O
On O
the O
following O
day O
he O
led O
out O
the O
main O
body O
of O
his O
army O
and O
drawing O
them O
up O
in O
order O
of O
battle O
before O
the O
walls O
of O
the O
Athenians O
to O
prevent O
their O
going O
to O
the O
relief O
of O
any O
other O
quarter O
dispatched O
a O
strong O
force O
against O
Fort O
Labdalum O
and O
took O
it O
and O
put O
all O
whom O
he O
found O
in O
it O
to O
the O
sword O
the O
place O
not O
being O
within O
sight O
of O
the O
Athenians. O
On O
the O
same O
day O
an O
Athenian O
galley O
that O
lay O
moored O
off O
the O
harbour O
was O
captured O
by O
the O
Syracusans. O
4After O
this O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
began O
to O
carry O
a O
single O
wall O
starting O
from O
the O
city O
in O
a O
slanting O
direction O
up O
Epipolae O
in O
order O
that O
the O
Athenians O
unless O
they O
could O
hinder O
the O
work O
might O
be O
no O
longer O
able O
to O
invest O
them. O
Meanwhile O
the O
Athenians O
having O
now O
finished O
their O
wall O
down O
to O
the O
sea O
had O
come O
up O
to O
the O
heights; O
and O
part O
of O
their O
wall O
being O
weak O
Gylippus O
drew O
out O
his O
army O
by O
night O
and O
attacked O
it. O
However O
the O
Athenians O
who O
happened O
to O
be O
bivouacking O
outside O
took O
the O
alarm O
and O
came O
out O
to O
meet O
him O
upon O
seeing O
which O
he O
quickly O
led O
his O
men O
back O
again. O
The O
Athenians O
now O
built O
their O
wall O
higher O
and O
in O
future O
kept O
guard O
at O
this O
point O
themselves O
disposing O
their O
confederates O
along O
the O
remainder O
of O
the O
works O
at O
the O
stations O
assigned O
to O
them. O
Nicias O
also O
determined O
to O
fortify O
Plemmyrium O
a O
promontory O
over O
against O
the O
city O
which B-PER
juts O
out O
and O
narrows O
the O
mouth O
of O
the O
Great O
Harbour. O
He O
thought O
that O
the O
fortification O
of O
this O
place O
would O
make O
it O
easier O
to O
bring O
in O
supplies O
as O
they O
would O
be O
able O
to O
carry O
on O
their O
blockade O
from O
a O
less O
distance O
near O
to O
the O
port O
occupied O
by O
the O
Syracusans; O
instead O
of O
being O
obliged O
upon O
every O
movement O
of O
the O
enemy's O
navy O
to O
put O
out O
against O
them O
from O
the O
bottom O
of O
the O
great O
harbour. O
Besides O
this O
he O
now O
began O
to O
pay O
more O
attention O
to O
the O
war O
by O
sea O
seeing O
that O
the O
coming O
of O
Gylippus O
had O
diminished O
their O
hopes O
by O
land. O
Accordingly O
he O
conveyed O
over O
his O
ships O
and O
some O
troops O
and O
built O
three O
forts O
in O
which O
he O
placed O
most O
of O
his O
baggage O
and O
moored O
there O
for O
the O
future O
the O
larger O
craft O
and O
men O
of O
war. O
This O
was O
the O
first O
and O
chief O
occasion O
of O
the O
losses O
which O
the O
crews O
experienced. O
The O
water O
which O
they O
used O
was O
scarce O
and O
had O
to O
be O
fetched O
from O
far O
and O
the O
sailors O
could O
not O
go O
out O
for O
firewood O
without O
being O
cut O
off O
by O
the O
Syracusan O
horse O
who O
were O
masters O
of O
the O
country; O
a O
third O
of O
the O
enemy's O
cavalry O
being O
stationed O
at O
the O
little O
town O
of O
Olympieum O
to O
prevent O
plundering O
incursions O
on O
the O
part O
of O
the O
Athenians O
at O
Plemmyrium. O
Meanwhile O
Nicias O
learned O
that O
the O
rest O
of O
the O
Corinthian O
fleet O
was O
approaching O
and O
sent O
twenty O
ships O
to O
watch B-PER
for O
them O
with O
orders O
to O
be O
on O
the O
look O
out O
for O
them O
about O
Locris O
and O
Rhegium O
and O
the O
approach O
to O
Sicily. O
5Gylippus O
meanwhile O
went O
on O
with O
the O
wall O
across O
Epipolae B-LOC
using O
the B-LOC
stones O
which O
the O
Athenians O
had O
laid O
down O
for O
their O
own O
wall O
and O
at O
the O
same O
time O
constantly O
led O
out O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
and O
formed O
them O
in O
order O
of O
battle O
in O
front O
of O
the O
lines O
the O
Athenians O
forming O
against O
him. O
At O
last O
he O
thought O
that O
the O
moment O
was O
come O
and O
began O
the O
attack; O
and O
a O
hand O
to O
hand O
fight O
ensued O
between O
the O
lines O
where O
the O
Syracusan O
cavalry O
could O
be O
of O
no O
use; O
and O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
were O
defeated O
and O
took O
up O
their O
dead O
under O
truce O
while O
the O
Athenians O
erected O
a O
trophy. O
After O
this O
Gylippus O
called O
the O
soldiers O
together O
and O
said O
that O
the O
fault O
was O
not O
theirs O
but O
his; O
he O
had O
kept O
their O
lines O
too O
much O
within O
the O
works O
and O
had O
thus O
deprived O
them O
of O
the O
services O
of O
their O
cavalry O
and O
darters. O
He O
would O
now O
therefore O
lead O
them O
on O
a O
second O
time. O
He O
begged O
them O
to O
remember O
that O
in O
material O
force O
they O
would O
be O
fully O
a O
match O
for O
their O
opponents O
while O
with O
respect O
to O
moral O
advantages O
it O
were O
intolerable O
if O
Peloponnesians O
and O
Dorians O
should O
not O
feel O
confident O
of O
overcoming O
Ionians O
and O
islanders O
with O
the O
motley O
rabble O
that O
accompanied O
them O
and O
of O
driving O
them O
out O
of O
the O
country. O
6After O
this O
he O
embraced O
the O
first O
opportunity O
that O
offered O
of O
again O
leading O
them O
against O
the O
enemy. O
Now O
Nicias O
and O
the O
Athenians O
held O
the O
opinion O
that O
even O
if O
the O
Syracusans O
should O
not O
wish O
to O
offer O
battle O
it O
was O
necessary O
for O
them O
to O
prevent O
the O
building O
of O
the O
cross O
wall O
as O
it O
already O
almost O
overlapped O
the O
extreme O
point O
of O
their O
own O
and O
if O
it O
went O
any O
further O
it O
would O
from O
that O
moment O
make O
no O
difference O
whether O
they O
fought O
ever O
so O
many O
successful O
actions O
or O
never O
fought O
at O
all. O
They O
accordingly O
came O
out O
to O
meet O
the O
Syracusans. O
Gylippus O
led O
out O
his O
heavy O
infantry O
further O
from O
the O
fortifications O
than O
on O
the O
former O
occasion O
and O
so O
joined O
battle; O
posting O
his O
horse O
and O
darters O
upon O
the O
flank O
of O
the O
Athenians O
in O
the O
open O
space O
where O
the O
works O
of O
the O
two O
walls O
terminated. O
During O
the O
engagement O
the O
cavalry O
attacked O
and O
routed O
the O
left O
wing O
of O
the O
Athenians O
which O
was O
opposed O
to O
them; O
and O
the O
rest O
of O
the O
Athenian O
army O
was O
in O
consequence O
defeated O
by O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
driven O
headlong O
within O
their O
lines. O
The O
night O
following O
the O
Syracusans O
carried O
their O
wall O
up O
to O
the O
Athenian O
works O
and O
passed O
them O
thus O
putting O
it O
out O
of O
their O
power O
any O
longer O
to O
stop O
them O
and O
depriving O
them O
even O
if O
victorious O
in O
the O
field O
of O
all O
chance O
of O
investing O
the O
city O
for O
the O
future. O
7After O
this O
the O
remaining O
twelve O
vessels O
of O
the O
Corinthians O
Ambraciots O
and O
Leucadians O
sailed O
into O
the O
harbour O
under O
the O
command O
of O
Erasinides O
a O
Corinthian O
having O
eluded O
the O
Athenian O
ships O
on O
guard O
and O
helped O
the O
Syracusans O
in O
completing O
the O
remainder O
of O
the O
cross O
wall. O
Meanwhile O
Gylippus O
went O
into O
the O
rest O
of O
Sicily O
to O
raise O
land O
and O
naval O
forces O
and O
also O
to O
bring O
over O
any O
of O
the O
cities O
that O
either O
were O
lukewarm O
in O
the O
cause O
or O
had O
hitherto O
kept B-LOC
out O
of O
the O
war O
altogether. O
Syracusan O
and O
Corinthian O
envoys O
were O
also O
dispatched O
to O
Lacedaemon O
and O
Corinth O
to O
get O
a O
fresh O
force O
sent O
over O
in O
any O
way O
that O
might O
offer O
either O
in O
merchant O
vessels O
or O
transports O
or O
in O
any O
other O
manner O
likely O
to O
prove O
successful O
as O
the O
Athenians O
too O
were O
sending O
for O
reinforcements; O
while O
the O
Syracusans O
proceeded O
to O
man O
a O
fleet O
and O
to O
exercise O
meaning O
to O
try O
their O
fortune O
in O
this O
way O
also O
and O
generally O
became O
exceedingly O
confident. O
8Nicias O
perceiving O
this O
and O
seeing O
the O
strength O
of O
the O
enemy O
and O
his O
own O
difficulties O
daily O
increasing O
himself O
also O
sent O
to O
Athens. O
He O
had O
before O
sent O
frequent O
reports O
of O
events O
as O
they O
occurred O
and O
felt O
it O
especially O
incumbent O
upon O
him O
to O
do O
so O
now O
as O
he O
thought O
that O
they O
were O
in O
a O
critical O
position O
and O
that O
unless O
speedily O
recalled O
or O
strongly O
reinforced O
from O
home O
they O
had O
no O
hope O
of O
safety. O
He O
feared O
however O
that O
the O
messengers O
either O
through O
inability O
to O
speak O
or O
through O
failure O
of O
memory O
or O
from O
a O
wish O
to O
please O
the O
multitude O
might O
not O
report O
the O
truth O
and O
so O
thought O
it O
best O
to O
write O
a O
letter O
to O
ensure O
that O
the O
Athenians O
should O
know O
his O
own O
opinion O
without O
its O
being O
lost O
in O
transmission O
and O
be O
able O
to O
decide O
upon O
the O
real O
facts O
of O
the O
case. O
His O
emissaries O
accordingly O
departed O
with O
the O
letter O
and O
the O
requisite O
verbal O
instructions; O
and O
he O
attended O
to O
the O
affairs O
of O
the O
army O
making O
it O
his O
aim O
now O
to O
keep O
on O
the O
defensive O
and O
to O
avoid O
any O
unnecessary O
danger. O
9At O
the O
close O
of O
the O
same O
summer O
the O
Athenian O
general O
Euetion O
marched O
in O
concert O
with O
Perdiccas O
with O
a O
large O
body O
of O
Thracians O
against O
Amphipolis O
and O
failing O
to O
take O
it O
brought O
some O
galleys O
round O
into O
the O
Strymon O
and O
blockaded O
the O
town O
from O
the O
river O
having O
his O
base O
at O
Himeraeum. O
Summer O
was O
now O
over. O
10The O
winter O
ensuing O
the O
persons O
sent O
by O
Nicias O
reaching O
Athens O
gave O
the O
verbal O
messages O
which O
had O
been O
entrusted O
to O
them O
and O
answered O
any O
questions O
that O
were O
asked O
them O
and O
delivered O
the O
letter. O
The O
clerk O
of O
the O
city O
now O
came O
forward O
and O
read O
out O
to O
the O
Athenians O
the O
letter O
which O
was O
as O
follows O
11"Our O
past O
operations O
Athenians O
have O
been O
made O
known O
to O
you O
by O
many O
other O
letters; O
it O
is O
now O
time O
for O
you O
to O
become O
equally O
familiar O
with O
our O
present O
condition O
and O
to O
take O
your O
measures O
accordingly. O
We O
had O
defeated O
in O
most O
of O
our O
engagements O
with O
them O
the O
Syracusans O
against O
whom O
we O
were O
sent O
and O
we O
had O
built O
the O
works O
which O
we O
now O
occupy O
when O
Gylippus O
arrived O
from O
Lacedaemon O
with O
an O
army O
obtained O
from O
Peloponnese O
and O
from O
some O
of O
the O
cities O
in O
Sicily. O
In O
our O
first O
battle O
with O
him O
we O
were O
victorious; O
in O
the O
battle O
on O
the O
following O
day O
we O
were O
overpowered O
by O
a O
multitude O
of O
cavalry O
and O
darters O
and O
compelled O
to O
retire O
within O
our O
lines. O
We O
have O
now O
therefore O
been O
forced O
by O
the O
numbers O
of O
those O
opposed O
to O
us O
to O
discontinue O
the O
work O
of O
circumvallation O
and O
to O
remain O
inactive; O
being O
unable O
to O
make O
use O
even O
of O
all O
the O
force O
we O
have O
since O
a O
large O
portion O
of O
our O
heavy O
infantry O
is O
absorbed O
in O
the O
defence O
of O
our O
lines. O
Meanwhile O
the O
enemy O
have O
carried O
a O
single O
wall O
past O
our O
lines O
thus O
making O
it O
impossible O
for O
us O
to O
invest O
them O
in O
future O
until O
this O
cross O
wall O
be O
attacked O
by O
a O
strong O
force O
and O
captured. O
So O
that O
the O
besieger O
in O
name O
has O
become O
at O
least O
from O
the O
land O
side O
the O
besieged O
in O
reality; O
as O
we O
are O
prevented O
by O
their O
cavalry O
from O
even O
going O
for O
any O
distance O
into O
the O
country. O
12"Besides O
this O
an O
embassy O
has O
been O
dispatched O
to O
Peloponnese O
to O
procure O
reinforcements O
and O
Gylippus O
has O
gone O
to O
the O
cities O
in O
Sicily O
partly O
in O
the O
hope O
of O
inducing O
those O
that O
are O
at O
present O
neutral O
to O
join O
him O
in O
the O
war O
partly O
of O
bringing O
from O
his O
allies O
additional O
contingents O
for O
the O
land O
forces O
and O
material O
for O
the O
navy. O
For O
I O
understand O
that O
they O
contemplate O
a O
combined O
attack O
upon O
our O
lines O
with O
their O
land O
forces O
and O
with O
their O
fleet O
by O
sea. O
You O
must O
none O
of O
you O
be O
surprised O
that O
I O
say O
by O
sea O
also. O
They O
have O
discovered O
that O
the O
length O
of O
the O
time O
we O
have O
now O
been O
in O
commission O
has O
rotted O
our O
ships O
and O
wasted O
our O
crews O
and O
that O
with O
the O
entireness O
of O
our O
crews O
and O
the O
soundness O
of O
our O
ships O
the O
pristine O
efficiency O
of O
our O
navy O
has O
departed. O
For O
it O
is O
impossible O
for O
us O
to O
haul O
our O
ships O
ashore O
and O
careen O
them O
because O
the O
enemy's O
vessels O
being O
as O
many O
or O
more O
than O
our O
own O
we O
are O
constantly O
anticipating O
an O
attack. O
Indeed O
they O
may O
be O
seen O
exercising O
and O
it O
lies O
with O
them O
to O
take O
the O
initiative; O
and O
not O
having O
to O
maintain O
a O
blockade O
they O
have O
greater O
facilities O
for O
drying O
their O
ships. O
13"This O
we O
should O
scarcely O
be O
able O
to O
do O
even O
if O
we O
had O
plenty O
of O
ships O
to O
spare O
and O
were O
freed O
from O
our O
present O
necessity O
of O
exhausting O
all O
our O
strength O
upon O
the O
blockade. O
For O
it O
is O
already O
difficult O
to O
carry O
in O
supplies O
past O
Syracuse; O
and O
were O
we O
to O
relax O
our O
vigilance O
in O
the O
slightest O
degree O
it O
would O
become O
impossible. O
The O
losses O
which O
our O
crews O
have O
suffered O
and O
still O
continue O
to O
suffer O
arise O
from O
the O
following O
causes. O
Expeditions O
for O
fuel O
and O
for O
forage O
and O
the O
distance O
from O
which O
water O
has O
to O
be O
fetched O
cause O
our O
sailors O
to O
be O
cut O
off O
by O
the O
Syracusan O
cavalry; O
the O
loss O
of O
our O
previous O
superiority O
emboldens O
our O
slaves O
to O
desert; O
our O
foreign O
seamen O
are O
impressed O
by O
the O
unexpected O
appearance O
of O
a O
navy O
against O
us O
and O
the O
strength O
of O
the O
enemy's O
resistance; O
such O
of O
them O
as O
were O
pressed O
into O
the O
service O
take O
the O
first O
opportunity O
of O
departing O
to O
their O
respective O
cities; O
such O
as O
were O
originally O
seduced O
by O
the O
temptation O
of O
high O
pay O
and O
expected O
little O
fighting O
and O
large O
gains O
leave O
us O
either O
by O
desertion O
to O
the O
enemy O
or O
by O
availing O
themselves O
of O
one O
or O
other O
of O
the O
various O
facilities O
of O
escape O
which O
the O
magnitude O
of O
Sicily O
affords O
them. O
Some O
even O
engage O
in O
trade O
themselves O
and O
prevail O
upon O
the O
captains O
to O
take O
Hyccaric O
slaves O
on O
board O
in O
their O
place; O
thus O
they O
have O
ruined O
the O
efficiency O
of O
our O
navy. O
14"Now O
I O
need O
not B-LOC
remind O
you O
that O
the O
time O
during O
which O
a O
crew O
is O
in O
its O
prime O
is O
short O
and O
that O
the O
number O
of O
sailors O
who O
can O
start O
a O
ship O
on O
her O
way O
and O
keep O
the O
rowing O
in O
time O
is O
small. O
But O
by O
far O
my O
greatest O
trouble O
is O
that O
holding O
the O
post O
which O
I O
do O
I O
am O
prevented O
by O
the O
natural O
indocility O
of O
the O
Athenian O
seaman O
from O
putting O
a O
stop O
to O
these O
evils; O
and O
that O
meanwhile O
we O
have O
no O
source O
from O
which O
to O
recruit O
our O
crews O
which O
the O
enemy O
can O
do O
from O
many O
quarters O
but O
are O
compelled O
to O
depend O
both O
for O
supplying O
the O
crews O
in O
service O
and O
for O
making O
good O
our O
losses O
upon O
the O
men O
whom O
we O
brought O
with O
us. O
For O
our O
present O
confederates O
Naxos O
and O
Catana O
are O
incapable O
of O
supplying O
us. O
There O
is O
only O
one O
thing O
more O
wanting O
to O
our O
opponents O
I O
mean O
the O
defection O
of O
our O
Italian O
markets. O
If O
they O
were O
to O
see O
you O
neglect O
to O
relieve O
us O
from O
our O
present O
condition O
and O
were O
to O
go O
over O
to O
the O
enemy O
famine O
would O
compel O
us O
to O
evacuate O
and O
Syracuse O
would O
finish O
the O
war O
without O
a O
blow. O
"I O
might O
it O
is O
true O
have O
written O
to O
you O
something O
different O
and O
more O
agreeable O
than O
this O
but O
nothing O
certainly O
more O
useful O
if O
it O
is O
desirable O
for O
you O
to O
know O
the O
real O
state B-LOC
of O
things O
here O
before O
taking O
your O
measures. O
Besides O
I O
know O
that O
it O
is O
your O
nature O
to O
love O
to O
be O
told O
the O
best O
side O
of O
things O
and O
then O
to O
blame O
the O
teller O
if O
the O
expectations O
which O
he O
has O
raised O
in O
your O
minds O
are O
not O
answered O
by O
the O
result; O
and O
I O
therefore O
thought O
it O
safest O
to O
declare O
to O
you O
the O
truth. O
15"Now O
you O
are O
not O
to O
think O
that O
either O
your O
generals O
or O
your O
soldiers O
have O
ceased O
to O
be O
a O
match O
for O
the O
forces O
originally O
opposed O
to O
them. O
But O
you O
are O
to O
reflect O
that O
a O
general O
Sicilian O
coalition O
is O
being O
formed O
against O
us; O
that O
a O
fresh O
army O
is O
expected O
from O
Peloponnese O
while O
the O
force O
we O
have O
here O
is O
unable O
to O
cope O
even O
with O
our O
present O
antagonists; O
and O
you O
must O
promptly O
decide O
either O
to O
recall O
us O
or O
to O
send O
out O
to O
us O
another O
fleet O
and O
army O
as O
numerous O
again O
with O
a O
large O
sum O
of O
money O
and O
someone O
to O
succeed O
me O
as O
a O
disease O
in O
the O
kidneys O
unfits O
me O
for O
retaining O
my O
post. O
I O
have O
I O
think O
some O
claim O
on O
your O
indulgence O
as O
while O
I O
was O
in O
my O
prime O
I O
did O
you O
much O
good O
service O
in O
my O
commands. O
But O
whatever O
you O
mean O
to O
do O
do O
it O
at O
the O
commencement O
of O
spring O
and O
without O
delay O
as O
the O
enemy O
will O
obtain O
his O
Sicilian O
reinforcements O
shortly O
those O
from O
Peloponnese O
after O
a O
longer O
interval; O
and O
unless O
you O
attend O
to O
the O
matter O
the O
former O
will O
be O
here O
before O
you O
while O
the O
latter O
will O
elude O
you O
as O
they O
have O
done O
before." O
16Such O
were O
the O
contents O
of O
Nicias's O
letter. O
When O
the O
Athenians O
had O
heard O
it O
they O
refused O
to O
accept O
his O
resignation O
but O
chose O
him O
two O
colleagues O
naming O
Menander O
and O
Euthydemus O
two O
of O
the O
officers O
at O
the O
seat O
of O
war O
to O
fill O
their O
places O
until O
their O
arrival O
that O
Nicias O
might O
not O
be O
left O
alone O
in O
his O
sickness O
to O
bear O
the O
whole O
weight O
of O
affairs. O
They O
also O
voted O
to O
send O
out O
another O
army O
and O
navy O
drawn O
partly O
from O
the O
Athenians O
on O
the O
muster O
roll O
partly O
from O
the O
allies. O
The O
colleagues O
chosen O
for B-PER
Nicias I-PER
were O
Demosthenes O
son O
of O
Alcisthenes O
and O
Eurymedon O
son O
of O
Thucles. O
Eurymedon O
was O
sent O
off O
at O
once O
about O
the O
time O
of O
the O
winter O
solstice O
with O
ten O
ships O
a O
hundred O
and O
twenty O
talents O
of O
silver O
and O
instructions O
to O
tell O
the O
army O
that O
reinforcements B-PER
would O
arrive O
and O
that O
care O
would O
be O
taken O
of O
them; O
17but O
Demosthenes O
stayed O
behind O
to O
organize O
the O
expedition O
meaning O
to O
start O
as O
soon O
as O
it O
was O
spring O
and O
sent O
for O
troops O
to O
the O
allies O
and O
meanwhile O
got O
together O
money O
ships O
and O
heavy O
infantry O
at O
home. O
The O
Athenians O
also O
sent O
twenty O
vessels O
round O
Peloponnese O
to O
prevent O
any O
one O
crossing O
over O
to O
Sicily O
from O
Corinth O
or O
Peloponnese. O
For O
the O
Corinthians O
filled O
with O
confidence O
by O
the O
favourable O
alteration O
in O
Sicilian O
affairs O
which O
had O
been O
reported O
by O
the O
envoys O
upon O
their O
arrival O
and O
convinced O
that O
the O
fleet O
which O
they O
had O
before O
sent O
out O
had O
not B-LOC
been O
without O
its O
use O
were O
now O
preparing O
to O
dispatch O
a O
force O
of O
heavy O
infantry O
in O
merchant O
vessels O
to O
Sicily O
while O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
did O
the O
like O
for O
the O
rest O
of O
Peloponnese. O
The O
Corinthians O
also O
manned O
a O
fleet O
of O
twenty O
five O
vessels O
intending O
to O
try O
the O
result O
of O
a O
battle O
with O
the O
squadron O
on O
guard O
at O
Naupactus O
and O
meanwhile O
to O
make O
it O
less O
easy O
for O
the O
Athenians O
there O
to O
hinder O
the O
departure O
of O
their O
merchantmen O
by O
obliging O
them O
to O
keep O
an O
eye O
upon O
the O
galleys O
thus O
arrayed O
against O
them. O
18In O
the O
meantime O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
prepared O
for O
their O
invasion O
of O
Attica O
in O
accordance O
with O
their O
own O
previous O
resolve O
and O
at O
the O
instigation O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
Corinthians O
who O
wished O
for O
an O
invasion O
to O
arrest O
the O
reinforcements O
which O
they O
heard O
that O
Athens O
was O
about O
to O
send O
to O
Sicily. O
Alcibiades O
also O
urgently O
advised O
the O
fortification O
of O
Decelea O
and O
a O
vigorous O
prosecution O
of O
the O
war. O
But O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
derived O
most O
encouragement O
from O
the O
belief O
that O
Athens O
with O
two O
wars O
on O
her O
hands O
against O
themselves O
and O
against O
the O
Siceliots O
would O
be O
more O
easy O
to O
subdue O
and O
from O
the O
conviction O
that O
she O
had O
been O
the O
first O
to O
infringe O
the O
truce. O
In O
the O
former O
war O
they O
considered O
the O
offence O
had O
been O
more O
on O
their O
own O
side O
both O
on O
account O
of O
the O
entrance O
of O
the O
Thebans O
into O
Plataea O
in O
time O
of O
peace O
and O
also O
of O
their O
own O
refusal O
to O
listen O
to O
the O
Athenian O
offer O
of O
arbitration O
in O
spite O
of O
the O
clause O
in O
the O
former O
treaty O
that O
where O
arbitration O
should O
be O
offered O
there O
should O
be O
no O
appeal O
to O
arms. O
For O
this O
reason O
they O
thought O
that O
they O
deserved O
their O
misfortunes O
and O
took O
to O
heart O
seriously O
the O
disaster O
at O
Pylos O
and O
whatever O
else O
had O
befallen O
them. O
But O
when O
besides O
the O
ravages O
from O
Pylos O
which O
went O
on O
without O
any O
intermission O
the O
thirty O
Athenian O
ships O
came O
out O
from O
Argos O
and O
wasted O
part O
of O
Epidaurus O
Prasiae O
and O
other O
places; O
when O
upon O
every O
dispute O
that O
arose O
as O
to O
the O
interpretation O
of O
any O
doubtful O
point O
in O
the O
treaty O
their O
own O
offers O
of O
arbitration O
were O
always O
rejected O
by O
the O
Athenians O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
at O
length O
decided O
that O
Athens O
had O
now O
committed O
the O
very O
same O
offence O
as O
they O
had O
before O
done O
and O
had O
become O
the O
guilty O
party; O
and O
they O
began O
to O
be O
full O
of O
ardour O
for O
the O
war. O
They O
spent O
this O
winter O
in O
sending O
round O
to O
their O
allies O
for O
iron O
and O
in O
getting O
ready O
the O
other O
implements O
for O
building O
their O
fort; O
and O
meanwhile O
began O
raising O
at O
home O
and O
also O
by O
forced O
requisitions O
in O
the O
rest O
of O
Peloponnese O
a O
force O
to O
be O
sent O
out O
in O
the O
merchantmen O
to O
their O
allies O
in O
Sicily. O
Winter O
thus O
ended O
and O
with O
it O
the O
eighteenth O
year O
of O
this O
war O
of O
which O
Thucydides O
is O
the O
historian. O
19In O
the O
first O
days O
of O
the O
spring O
following O
at O
an O
earlier O
period O
than O
usual O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
and O
their O
allies O
invaded O
Attica O
under O
the O
command O
of O
Agis O
son O
of O
Archidamus O
king O
of O
the O
Lacedaemonians. O
They O
began O
by O
devastating O
the O
parts O
bordering O
upon O
the O
plain O
and O
next O
proceeded O
to O
fortify O
Decelea O
dividing O
the O
work O
among O
the O
different O
cities. O
Decelea O
is O
about O
thirteen O
or O
fourteen O
miles O
from O
the O
city O
of O
Athens O
and O
the O
same O
distance O
or O
not O
much O
further O
from O
Boeotia; O
and O
the O
fort O
was O
meant O
to O
annoy O
the O
plain O
and O
the O
richest O
parts O
of O
the O
country O
being O
in O
sight O
of O
Athens. O
While O
the O
Peloponnesians O
and O
their O
allies O
in O
Attica O
were O
engaged O
in O
the O
work O
of O
fortification O
their O
countrymen O
at O
home O
sent O
off O
at O
about O
the O
same O
time O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
in O
the O
merchant O
vessels O
to O
Sicily; O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
furnishing O
a O
picked O
force O
of O
Helots O
and O
Neodamodes O
(or O
freedmen) O
six O
hundred O
heavy O
infantry O
in O
all O
under O
the O
command O
of O
Eccritus O
a O
Spartan; O
and O
the O
Boeotians O
three O
hundred O
heavy O
infantry O
commanded O
by O
two O
Thebans O
Xenon O
and O
Nicon O
and O
by O
Hegesander O
a O
Thespian. O
These O
were O
among O
the O
first O
to O
put O
out O
into O
the O
open O
sea O
starting O
from O
Taenarus O
in O
Laconia. O
Not O
long O
after O
their O
departure O
the O
Corinthians O
sent O
off O
a O
force O
of O
five O
hundred O
heavy O
infantry O
consisting O
partly O
of O
men O
from O
Corinth O
itself O
and O
partly O
of O
Arcadian O
mercenaries O
placed O
under O
the O
command O
of O
Alexarchus O
a O
Corinthian. O
The O
Sicyonians O
also O
sent O
off O
two O
hundred O
heavy O
infantry O
at O
same O
time O
as O
the O
Corinthians O
under O
the O
command O
of O
Sargeus O
a O
Sicyonian. O
Meantime O
the O
five O
and O
twenty O
vessels O
manned O
by O
Corinth O
during O
the O
winter O
lay O
confronting O
the O
twenty O
Athenian O
ships O
at O
Naupactus O
until O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
in O
the O
merchantmen O
were O
fairly O
on O
their O
way O
from O
Peloponnese; O
thus O
fulfilling O
the O
object O
for O
which O
they O
had O
been O
manned O
originally O
which O
was O
to O
divert O
the O
attention O
of O
the O
Athenians O
from O
the O
merchantmen O
to O
the O
galleys. O
20During O
this O
time O
the O
Athenians O
were O
not O
idle. O
Simultaneously O
with O
the O
fortification O
of O
Decelea O
at O
the O
very O
beginning O
of O
spring O
they O
sent O
thirty O
ships O
round O
Peloponnese O
under O
Charicles O
son O
of O
Apollodorus O
with O
instructions O
to O
call O
at O
Argos O
and O
demand O
a O
force O
of O
their O
heavy O
infantry O
for O
the O
fleet O
agreeably O
to O
the O
alliance. O
At O
the O
same O
time O
they O
dispatched O
Demosthenes O
to O
Sicily O
as O
they O
had O
intended O
with O
sixty O
Athenian O
and O
five O
Chian O
vessels O
twelve O
hundred O
Athenian O
heavy O
infantry O
from O
the O
muster O
roll O
and O
as O
many O
of O
the O
islanders O
as O
could O
be O
raised O
in O
the O
different O
quarters O
drawing O
upon O
the O
other O
subject O
allies O
for O
whatever O
they O
could O
supply O
that O
would O
be O
of O
use O
for O
the O
war. O
Demosthenes O
was O
instructed O
first O
to O
sail O
round O
with O
Charicles O
and O
to O
operate O
with O
him O
upon O
the O
coasts O
of O
Laconia O
and O
accordingly O
sailed O
to O
Aegina O
and O
there O
waited O
for O
the O
remainder O
of O
his O
armament O
and O
for O
Charicles O
to O
fetch O
the O
Argive O
troops. O
21In O
Sicily O
about O
the O
same O
time O
in O
this O
spring O
Gylippus O
came O
to O
Syracuse O
with O
as O
many O
troops O
as O
he O
could O
bring O
from O
the O
cities O
which O
he O
had O
persuaded O
to O
join. O
Calling O
the O
Syracusans O
together O
he O
told O
them O
that O
they O
must O
man O
as O
many O
ships O
as O
possible O
and O
try O
their O
hand O
at O
a O
sea O
fight O
by O
which O
he O
hoped O
to O
achieve O
an O
advantage O
in O
the O
war O
not O
unworthy O
of O
the O
risk. O
With O
him O
Hermocrates O
actively O
joined B-LOC
in O
trying O
to O
encourage O
his O
countrymen O
to O
attack O
the O
Athenians O
at O
sea O
saying O
that O
the O
latter O
had O
not O
inherited O
their O
naval O
prowess O
nor O
would O
they O
retain O
it O
for O
ever; O
they O
had O
been O
landsmen O
even O
to O
a O
greater O
degree O
than O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
had O
only O
become O
a O
maritime O
power O
when O
obliged O
by O
the O
Mede. O
Besides O
to O
daring O
spirits O
like O
the O
Athenians O
a O
daring O
adversary O
would O
seem O
the O
most O
formidable; O
and O
the O
Athenian O
plan O
of O
paralysing O
by O
the O
boldness O
of O
their O
attack O
a O
neighbour O
often O
not O
their O
inferior O
in O
strength O
could O
now O
be O
used O
against O
them O
with O
as O
good O
effect O
by O
the O
Syracusans. O
He O
was O
convinced O
also O
that O
the O
unlooked O
for O
spectacle O
of O
Syracusans O
daring O
to O
face O
the O
Athenian O
navy O
would O
cause O
a O
terror O
to O
the O
enemy O
the O
advantages O
of O
which O
would O
far O
outweigh O
any O
loss O
that O
Athenian O
science O
might O
inflict O
upon O
their O
inexperience. O
He O
accordingly O
urged O
them O
to O
throw O
aside O
their O
fears O
and O
to O
try O
their O
fortune O
at O
sea; O
22and O
the O
Syracusans O
under O
the O
influence O
of O
Gylippus O
and O
Hermocrates O
and O
perhaps O
some O
others O
made O
up O
their O
minds O
for O
the O
sea O
fight O
and O
began O
to O
man O
their O
vessels. O
When O
the O
fleet O
was O
ready O
Gylippus O
led O
out O
the O
whole O
army O
by O
night; O
his O
plan O
being O
to O
assault O
in O
person O
the O
forts O
on O
Plemmyrium O
by O
land O
while O
thirty O
five O
Syracusan O
galleys O
sailed O
according O
to O
appointment O
against O
the O
enemy O
from O
the O
great O
harbour O
and O
the O
forty O
five O
remaining O
came O
round O
from O
the O
lesser O
harbour O
where O
they O
had O
their O
arsenal O
in O
order O
to O
effect O
a O
junction O
with O
those O
inside O
and O
simultaneously O
to O
attack O
Plemmyrium O
and O
thus O
to O
distract O
the O
Athenians O
by O
assaulting O
them O
on O
two O
sides O
at O
once. O
The O
Athenians O
quickly O
manned O
sixty O
ships O
and O
with O
twenty O
five O
of O
these O
engaged O
the O
thirty O
five O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
in O
the O
great O
harbour O
sending O
the O
rest O
to O
meet O
those O
sailing O
round O
from O
the O
arsenal; O
and O
an O
action O
now O
ensued O
directly O
in O
front O
of O
the O
mouth O
of O
the O
great O
harbour O
maintained O
with O
equal O
tenacity O
on O
both O
sides; O
the O
one O
wishing O
to O
force O
the O
passage O
the O
other O
to O
prevent O
them. O
23In O
the O
meantime O
while O
the O
Athenians O
in O
Plemmyrium O
were O
down O
at O
the O
sea O
attending O
to O
the O
engagement O
Gylippus O
made O
a O
sudden O
attack O
on O
the O
forts O
in O
the O
early O
morning O
and O
took O
the O
largest O
first O
and O
afterwards O
the O
two O
smaller O
whose O
garrisons O
did O
not O
wait O
for O
him O
seeing O
the O
largest O
so O
easily O
taken. O
At O
the O
fall O
of O
the O
first O
fort O
the O
men O
from O
it O
who O
succeeded O
in O
taking O
refuge O
in O
their O
boats O
and O
merchantmen O
found O
great O
difficulty O
in O
reaching O
the O
camp O
as O
the O
Syracusans O
were O
having O
the O
best O
of O
it O
in O
the O
engagement O
in O
the O
great O
harbour O
and O
sent O
a O
fast O
sailing O
galley O
to O
pursue O
them. O
But O
when O
the O
two O
others O
fell O
the O
Syracusans O
were O
now O
being O
defeated; O
and O
the O
fugitives O
from O
these O
sailed O
alongshore O
with O
more O
ease. O
The O
Syracusan O
ships O
fighting O
off O
the O
mouth O
of O
the O
harbour O
forced O
their O
way O
through O
the O
Athenian O
vessels O
and O
sailing O
in O
without O
any O
order O
fell O
foul O
of O
one O
another O
and O
transferred O
the O
victory O
to O
the O
Athenians; O
who O
not O
only O
routed O
the O
squadron O
in O
question O
but O
also O
that O
by O
which O
they O
were O
at O
first O
being O
defeated O
in O
the O
harbour O
sinking O
eleven O
of O
the O
Syracusan O
vessels O
and O
killing O
most O
of O
the O
men O
except O
the O
crews O
of O
three O
ships O
whom O
they O
made O
prisoners. O
Their O
own O
loss O
was O
confined O
to O
three O
vessels; O
and O
after O
hauling O
ashore O
the O
Syracusan O
wrecks O
and O
setting O
up O
a O
trophy O
upon O
the O
islet O
in O
front O
of O
Plemmyrium O
they O
retired O
to O
their O
own O
camp. O
24Unsuccessful O
at O
sea O
the O
Syracusans O
had O
nevertheless O
the O
forts O
in O
Plemmyrium O
for O
which O
they O
set O
up O
three O
trophies. O
One O
of O
the O
two O
last O
taken O
they O
razed O
but O
put O
in O
order O
and O
garrisoned O
the O
two O
others. O
In O
the O
capture O
of O
the O
forts O
a O
great O
many O
men O
were O
killed O
and O
made O
prisoners O
and O
a O
great O
quantity O
of O
property O
was O
taken O
in O
all. O
As O
the O
Athenians O
had O
used O
them O
as O
a O
magazine O
there O
was O
a O
large O
stock O
of O
goods O
and O
corn O
of O
the O
merchants O
inside O
and O
also O
a O
large O
stock O
belonging O
to O
the O
captains; O
the O
masts O
and O
other O
furniture O
of O
forty O
galleys O
being O
taken O
besides O
three O
galleys O
which O
had O
been O
drawn O
up O
on O
shore. O
Indeed O
the O
first O
and O
chiefest O
cause O
of O
the O
ruin O
of O
the O
Athenian O
army O
was O
the O
capture O
of O
Plemmyrium; O
even O
the O
entrance O
of O
the O
harbour O
being O
now O
no O
longer O
safe O
for O
carrying O
in O
provisions O
as O
the O
Syracusan O
vessels O
were O
stationed O
there O
to O
prevent O
it O
and O
nothing O
could O
be O
brought O
in O
without O
fighting; O
besides O
the O
general O
impression O
of O
dismay O
and O
discouragement O
produced O
upon O
the O
army. O
25After O
this O
the O
Syracusans O
sent O
out O
twelve O
ships O
under O
the O
command O
of O
Agatharchus O
a O
Syracusan. O
One O
of O
these O
went O
to O
Peloponnese O
with O
ambassadors O
to O
describe O
the O
hopeful O
state O
of O
their O
affairs O
and O
to O
incite O
the O
Peloponnesians O
to O
prosecute O
the O
war O
there O
even O
more O
actively O
than O
they O
were O
now O
doing O
while O
the O
eleven O
others O
sailed O
to O
Italy O
hearing O
that O
vessels O
laden O
with O
stores O
were O
on O
their O
way O
to O
the O
Athenians. O
After O
falling O
in O
with O
and O
destroying O
most O
of O
the O
vessels O
in O
question O
and O
burning O
in O
the O
Caulonian O
territory O
a O
quantity O
of O
timber O
for O
shipbuilding O
which O
had O
been O
got O
ready O
for O
the O
Athenians O
the O
Syracusan O
squadron O
went O
to O
Locri O
and O
one O
of O
the O
merchantmen O
from O
Peloponnese O
coming O
in O
while O
they O
were O
at O
anchor O
there O
carrying O
Thespian O
heavy O
infantry O
took O
these O
on O
board O
and O
sailed O
alongshore O
towards O
home. O
The O
Athenians O
were O
on O
the O
look O
out O
for O
them O
with O
twenty O
ships O
at O
Megara O
but O
were O
only O
able O
to O
take O
one O
vessel O
with O
its O
crew; O
the O
rest O
getting O
clear O
off O
to O
Syracuse. O
There O
was O
also O
some O
skirmishing O
in O
the O
harbour O
about O
the O
piles O
which O
the O
Syracusans O
had O
driven O
in O
the O
sea O
in O
front O
of O
the O
old O
docks O
to O
allow O
their O
ships O
to O
lie O
at O
anchor O
inside O
without O
being O
hurt O
by O
the O
Athenians O
sailing O
up O
and O
running O
them O
down. O
The O
Athenians O
brought O
up O
to O
them O
a O
ship O
of O
ten O
thousand O
talents O
burden O
furnished O
with O
wooden O
turrets O
and O
screens O
and O
fastened O
ropes O
round O
the O
piles O
from O
their O
boats O
wrenched O
them O
up O
and O
broke O
them O
or O
dived O
down O
and O
sawed O
them O
in O
two. O
Meanwhile O
the O
Syracusans O
plied O
them O
with O
missiles O
from O
the O
docks O
to O
which O
they O
replied O
from O
their O
large O
vessel; O
until O
at O
last O
most O
of O
the O
piles O
were O
removed O
by O
the O
Athenians. O
But O
the O
most O
awkward O
part O
of O
the O
stockade O
was O
the O
part O
out O
of O
sight O
some O
of O
the O
piles O
which O
had O
been O
driven O
in O
did O
not O
appear O
above O
water O
so O
that O
it O
was O
dangerous O
to O
sail O
up O
for O
fear O
of O
running O
the O
ships O
upon O
them O
just O
as O
upon O
a O
reef O
through O
not O
seeing O
them. O
However O
divers O
went O
down O
and O
sawed O
off O
even O
these O
for O
reward; O
although O
the O
Syracusans O
drove O
in O
others. O
Indeed O
there O
was O
no O
end O
to O
the O
contrivances O
to O
which O
they O
resorted O
against O
each O
other O
as O
might O
be O
expected O
between O
two O
hostile O
armies O
confronting O
each O
other O
at O
such O
a O
short O
distance O
and O
skirmishes O
and O
all O
kinds O
of O
other O
attempts O
were O
of O
constant O
occurrence. O
Meanwhile O
the O
Syracusans O
sent O
embassies O
to O
the O
cities O
composed O
of O
Corinthians O
Ambraciots O
and O
Lacedaemonians O
to O
tell O
them O
of O
the O
capture O
of O
Plemmyrium O
and O
that O
their O
defeat O
in O
the O
sea O
fight O
was O
due O
less O
to O
the O
strength O
of O
the O
enemy O
than O
to O
their O
own O
disorder; O
and O
generally O
to O
let O
them O
know O
that O
they O
were O
full O
of O
hope O
and O
to O
desire O
them O
to O
come O
to O
their O
help O
with O
ships O
and O
troops O
as O
the O
Athenians O
were O
expected O
with O
a O
fresh O
army O
and O
if O
the O
one O
already O
there O
could O
be O
destroyed O
before O
the O
other O
arrived O
the O
war O
would O
be O
at O
an O
end. O
26While O
the O
contending O
parties O
in O
Sicily O
were O
thus O
engaged O
Demosthenes O
having O
now O
got O
together O
the O
armament O
with O
which O
he O
was O
to O
go O
to O
the O
island O
put O
out O
from O
Aegina O
and O
making O
sail O
for O
Peloponnese O
joined O
Charicles O
and O
the O
thirty O
ships O
of O
the O
Athenians. O
Taking O
on O
board O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
from O
Argos O
they O
sailed O
to O
Laconia O
and O
after O
first O
plundering O
part O
of O
Epidaurus O
Limera O
landed O
on O
the O
coast O
of O
Laconia O
opposite O
Cythera O
where O
the O
temple O
of B-LOC
Apollo O
stands O
and O
laying O
waste O
part O
of O
the O
country O
fortified O
a O
sort O
of O
isthmus O
to O
which O
the O
Helots O
of O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
might O
desert O
and O
from O
whence O
plundering O
incursions O
might O
be O
made O
as O
from O
Pylos. O
Demosthenes O
helped O
to O
occupy O
this O
place O
and O
then O
immediately O
sailed O
on O
to O
Corcyra O
to O
take O
up O
some O
of O
the O
allies O
in O
that O
island O
and O
so O
to O
proceed O
without O
delay O
to O
Sicily; O
while O
Charicles O
waited O
until O
he O
had O
completed O
the O
fortification O
of O
the O
place O
and O
leaving O
a O
garrison O
there O
returned O
home O
subsequently O
with O
his O
thirty O
ships O
and O
the O
Argives O
also. O
27This O
same O
summer O
arrived O
at O
Athens O
thirteen O
hundred O
targeteers O
Thracian O
swordsmen O
of O
the O
tribe O
of O
the O
Dii O
who O
were O
to O
have O
sailed O
to O
Sicily O
with O
Demosthenes. O
Since O
they O
had O
come O
too O
late O
the O
Athenians O
determined O
to O
send O
them O
back O
to O
Thrace O
whence O
they O
had O
come; O
to O
keep O
them O
for O
the O
Decelean O
war O
appearing O
too O
expensive O
as O
the O
pay O
of O
each O
man O
was O
a O
drachma O
a O
day. O
Indeed O
since O
Decelea O
had O
been O
first O
fortified O
by O
the O
whole O
Peloponnesian O
army O
during O
this O
summer O
and O
then O
occupied O
for O
the O
annoyance O
of O
the O
country O
by O
the O
garrisons O
from O
the O
cities O
relieving O
each O
other B-LOC
at O
stated O
intervals O
it O
had O
been O
doing O
great O
mischief O
to O
the O
Athenians; O
in O
fact O
this O
occupation O
by O
the O
destruction O
of O
property O
and O
loss O
of O
men O
which O
resulted O
from O
it O
was O
one O
of O
the O
principal O
causes O
of O
their O
ruin. O
Previously O
the O
invasions O
were O
short O
and O
did O
not O
prevent O
their O
enjoying O
their O
land O
during O
the O
rest O
of O
the O
time O
the O
enemy O
was O
now O
permanently O
fixed O
in O
Attica; O
at O
one O
time O
it O
was O
an O
attack O
in O
force O
at O
another O
it O
was O
the O
regular O
garrison O
overrunning O
the O
country O
and O
making O
forays O
for O
its O
subsistence O
and O
the O
Lacedaemonian O
king O
Agis O
was O
in O
the O
field O
and O
diligently O
prosecuting O
the O
war; O
great O
mischief O
was O
therefore O
done O
to O
the O
Athenians. O
They O
were O
deprived O
of O
their O
whole O
country O
more O
than O
twenty O
thousand O
slaves O
had O
deserted O
a O
great O
part O
of O
them O
artisans O
and O
all O
their O
sheep O
and O
beasts O
of O
burden O
were O
lost; O
and O
as O
the O
cavalry O
rode O
out O
daily O
upon O
excursions O
to O
Decelea O
and O
to O
guard O
the O
country O
their O
horses O
were O
either O
lamed O
by O
being O
constantly O
worked O
upon O
rocky O
ground O
or O
wounded O
by O
the O
enemy. O
28Besides O
the O
transport O
of O
provisions O
from O
Euboea O
which O
had O
before O
been O
carried O
on O
so O
much O
more O
quickly O
overland O
by O
Decelea O
from O
Oropus O
was O
now O
effected O
at O
great O
cost O
by O
sea O
round O
Sunium; O
everything O
the O
city O
required O
had O
to O
be O
imported O
from O
abroad O
and O
instead O
of O
a O
city O
it O
became O
a O
fortress. O
Summer O
and O
winter O
the O
Athenians O
were O
worn O
out O
by O
having O
to O
keep O
guard O
on O
the O
fortifications O
during O
the O
day O
by O
turns O
by O
night O
all O
together O
the O
cavalry O
excepted O
at O
the O
different O
military O
posts O
or O
upon O
the O
wall. O
But O
what O
most O
oppressed O
them O
was O
that O
they O
had O
two O
wars O
at O
once O
and O
had O
thus O
reached O
a O
pitch O
of O
frenzy O
which O
no O
one O
would O
have O
believed O
possible O
if O
he O
had O
heard O
of O
it O
before O
it O
had O
come O
to O
pass. O
For O
could O
any O
one O
have O
imagined O
that O
even O
when O
besieged O
by O
the O
Peloponnesians O
entrenched O
in O
Attica O
they O
would O
still O
instead O
of O
withdrawing O
from O
Sicily O
stay O
on O
there O
besieging O
in O
like O
manner O
Syracuse O
a O
town O
(taken O
as O
a O
town) O
in O
no O
way O
inferior O
to O
Athens O
or O
would O
so O
thoroughly O
upset O
the O
Hellenic O
estimate O
of O
their O
strength O
and O
audacity O
as O
to O
give O
the O
spectacle O
of O
a O
people O
which O
at O
the O
beginning O
of O
the O
war O
some O
thought O
might O
hold O
out O
one O
year O
some O
two O
none O
more O
than O
three O
if O
the O
Peloponnesians O
invaded O
their O
country O
now O
seventeen O
years O
after O
the O
first O
invasion O
after O
having O
already O
suffered O
from O
all O
the O
evils O
of O
war O
going O
to O
Sicily O
and O
undertaking O
a O
new O
war O
nothing O
inferior O
to O
that O
which O
they O
already O
had O
with O
the O
Peloponnesians O
These O
causes O
the O
great O
losses O
from O
Decelea O
and O
the O
other O
heavy O
charges O
that O
fell O
upon O
them O
produced O
their O
financial O
embarrassment; O
and O
it O
was O
at O
this O
time O
that O
they O
imposed O
upon O
their O
subjects O
instead O
of O
the O
tribute O
the O
tax O
of O
a O
twentieth O
upon O
all O
imports O
and O
exports O
by O
sea O
which O
they O
thought O
would O
bring O
them O
in O
more O
money; O
their O
expenditure O
being O
now O
not O
the O
same B-LOC
as O
at O
first O
but O
having O
grown O
with O
the O
war O
while O
their O
revenues O
decayed. O
29Accordingly O
not O
wishing O
to O
incur O
expense O
in O
their O
present O
want O
of O
money O
they O
sent O
back O
at O
once O
the O
Thracians O
who O
came O
too O
late O
for O
Demosthenes O
under O
the O
conduct O
of O
Diitrephes O
who O
was O
instructed O
as O
they O
were O
to O
pass O
through O
the O
Euripus O
to O
make O
use O
of O
them O
if O
possible O
in O
the O
voyage O
alongshore O
to O
injure O
the O
enemy. O
Diitrephes O
first O
landed O
them O
at O
Tanagra O
and O
hastily O
snatched O
some O
booty; O
he O
then O
sailed O
across O
the O
Euripus O
in O
the O
evening O
from O
Chalcis O
in O
Euboea O
and O
disembarking O
in O
Boeotia O
led O
them O
against O
Mycalessus. O
The O
night O
he O
passed O
unobserved O
near O
the O
temple O
of O
Hermes O
not O
quite O
two O
miles O
from O
Mycalessus O
and O
at O
daybreak O
assaulted O
and O
took O
the O
town O
which O
is O
not O
a O
large O
one; O
the O
inhabitants O
being O
off O
their O
guard O
and O
not O
expecting O
that O
any O
one O
would O
ever O
come O
up O
so O
far O
from O
the O
sea O
to O
molest O
them O
the O
wall O
too O
being O
weak O
and O
in O
some O
places O
having O
tumbled O
down O
while O
in O
others O
it O
had O
not O
been O
built O
to O
any O
height O
and O
the O
gates O
also O
being O
left O
open O
through O
their O
feeling O
of O
security. O
The O
Thracians O
bursting O
into O
Mycalessus O
sacked O
the O
houses O
and O
temples O
and O
butchered O
the O
inhabitants O
sparing O
neither O
youth O
nor O
age O
but O
killing O
all O
they O
fell O
in O
with O
one O
after O
the O
other O
children O
and O
women O
and O
even O
beasts O
of O
burden O
and O
whatever O
other O
living O
creatures O
they O
saw; O
the O
Thracian O
race O
like O
the O
bloodiest O
of O
the O
barbarians O
being O
even O
more O
so O
when O
it O
has O
nothing O
to O
fear. O
Everywhere O
confusion O
reigned O
and O
death O
in O
all O
its O
shapes; O
and O
in O
particular O
they O
attacked O
a O
boys' O
school O
the O
largest O
that O
there O
was O
in O
the O
place O
into O
which O
the O
children O
had O
just O
gone O
and O
massacred O
them O
all. O
In O
short O
the O
disaster O
falling O
upon O
the O
whole O
town O
was O
unsurpassed O
in O
magnitude O
and O
unapproached O
by O
any O
in O
suddenness O
and O
in O
horror. O
30Meanwhile O
the O
Thebans O
heard O
of O
it O
and O
marched O
to O
the O
rescue O
and O
overtaking O
the O
Thracians O
before O
they O
had O
gone O
far O
recovered O
the O
plunder O
and O
drove O
them O
in O
panic O
to O
the O
Euripus O
and O
the O
sea O
where O
the O
vessels O
which O
brought O
them O
were O
lying. O
The O
greatest O
slaughter O
took O
place O
while O
they O
were O
embarking O
as O
they O
did O
not O
know O
how O
to O
swim O
and O
those O
in O
the O
vessels O
on O
seeing O
what O
was O
going O
on O
on O
on O
shore O
moored O
them O
out O
of O
bowshot O
in O
the O
rest O
of O
the O
retreat O
the O
Thracians O
made O
a O
very O
respectable O
defence O
against O
the O
Theban O
horse O
by O
which O
they O
were O
first O
attacked O
dashing O
out O
and O
closing O
their O
ranks O
according O
to O
the O
tactics O
of O
their O
country O
and O
lost O
only O
a O
few O
men O
in O
that O
part O
of O
the O
affair. O
A O
good O
number O
who O
were O
after O
plunder O
were O
actually O
caught O
in O
the O
town O
and O
put O
to O
death. O
Altogether O
the O
Thracians O
had O
two O
hundred O
and O
fifty O
killed O
out O
of O
thirteen O
hundred O
the O
Thebans O
and O
the O
rest O
who O
came O
to O
the O
rescue O
about O
twenty O
troopers O
and O
heavy O
infantry O
with O
Scirphondas O
one O
of O
the O
Boeotarchs. O
The O
Mycalessians O
lost O
a O
large O
proportion O
of O
their O
population. O
While O
Mycalessus O
thus O
experienced O
a O
calamity O
for O
its O
extent O
as O
lamentable O
as O
any O
that O
happened O
in O
the O
war O
31Demosthenes O
whom O
we O
left O
sailing O
to O
Corcyra O
after O
the O
building O
of O
the O
fort O
in O
Laconia O
found O
a O
merchantman O
lying O
at O
Phea O
in O
Elis O
in O
which O
the O
Corinthian O
heavy O
infantry O
were O
to O
cross O
to O
Sicily. O
The O
ship O
he O
destroyed O
but O
the O
men O
escaped O
and O
subsequently O
got O
another O
in O
which O
they O
pursued O
their O
voyage. O
After O
this O
arriving O
at O
Zacynthus O
and O
Cephallenia O
he O
took O
a O
body O
of O
heavy O
infantry O
on O
board O
and O
sending O
for O
some O
of O
the O
Messenians O
from O
Naupactus O
crossed O
over O
to O
the O
opposite O
coast O
of O
Acarnania O
to O
Alyzia O
and O
to O
Anactorium O
which O
was O
held O
by O
the O
Athenians. O
While O
he O
was O
in O
these O
parts O
he O
was O
met O
by O
Eurymedon O
returning O
from O
Sicily O
where O
he O
had O
been O
sent O
as O
has O
been O
mentioned O
during O
the O
winter O
with O
the O
money O
for O
the O
army O
who O
told O
him O
the O
news O
and O
also O
that O
he O
had O
heard O
while O
at O
sea O
that O
the O
Syracusans O
had O
taken O
Plemmyrium. O
Here O
also O
Conon O
came O
to O
them O
the O
commander O
at O
Naupactus O
with O
news O
that O
the O
twenty O
five O
Corinthian O
ships O
stationed O
opposite O
to O
him O
far O
from O
giving O
over O
the O
war O
were O
meditating O
an O
engagement; O
and O
he O
therefore O
begged O
them O
to O
send O
him O
some O
ships O
as O
his O
own O
eighteen O
were O
not O
a O
match O
for O
the O
enemy's O
twenty O
five. B-PER
Demosthenes O
and O
Eurymedon O
accordingly O
sent O
ten O
of O
their O
best O
sailers O
with O
Conon O
to O
reinforce O
the O
squadron O
at O
Naupactus O
and O
meanwhile O
prepared O
for O
the O
muster O
of O
their O
forces; O
Eurymedon O
who O
was O
now O
the O
colleague O
of O
Demosthenes O
and O
had O
turned O
back O
in O
consequence O
of O
his O
appointment O
sailing O
to O
Corcyra O
to O
tell O
them O
to O
man O
fifteen O
ships O
and O
to O
enlist O
heavy O
infantry; O
while O
Demosthenes O
raised O
slingers O
and O
darters O
from O
the O
parts O
about O
Acarnania. O
32Meanwhile O
the O
envoys O
already O
mentioned O
who O
had O
gone O
from O
Syracuse O
to O
the O
cities O
after O
the O
capture O
of O
Plemmyrium O
had O
succeeded O
in O
their O
mission O
and O
were O
about O
to O
bring O
the O
army O
that O
they O
had O
collected O
when O
Nicias O
got O
scent O
of O
it O
and O
sent O
to O
the O
Centoripae O
and O
Alicyaeans O
and O
other O
of O
the O
friendly O
Sicels O
who O
held O
the O
passes O
not O
to O
let O
the O
enemy O
through O
but O
to O
combine O
to O
prevent O
their O
passing O
there O
being O
no O
other O
way O
by O
which O
they O
could O
even O
attempt O
it O
as O
the O
Agrigentines O
would O
not O
give O
them O
a O
passage O
through O
their O
country. O
Agreeably O
to O
this O
request O
the O
Sicels O
laid O
a O
triple O
ambuscade O
for O
the O
Siceliots O
upon B-LOC
their I-LOC
march O
and O
attacking O
them O
suddenly O
while O
off O
their O
guard O
killed O
about O
eight O
hundred O
of O
them O
and O
all O
the O
envoys O
the O
Corinthian O
only O
excepted O
by O
whom B-PER
fifteen O
hundred O
who O
escaped O
were O
conducted O
to O
Syracuse. O
33About O
the O
same O
time O
the O
Camarinaeans O
also O
came O
to O
the O
assistance O
of O
Syracuse O
with O
five O
hundred O
heavy O
infantry O
three O
hundred O
darters O
and O
as O
many O
archers O
while O
the O
Geloans O
sent O
crews O
for O
five O
ships O
four O
hundred O
darters O
and O
two O
hundred O
horse. O
Indeed O
almost O
the O
whole O
of O
Sicily O
except O
the O
Agrigentines O
who O
were O
neutral O
now O
ceased O
merely O
to O
watch O
events O
as O
it O
had O
hitherto O
done O
and O
actively O
joined O
Syracuse O
against O
the O
Athenians. O
While O
the O
Syracusans O
after O
the O
Sicel O
disaster O
put O
off O
any O
immediate O
attack O
upon O
the O
Athenians O
Demosthenes O
and O
Eurymedon O
whose O
forces O
from O
Corcyra O
and O
the O
continent O
were O
now O
ready O
crossed O
the O
Ionian O
Gulf O
with O
all B-LOC
their I-LOC
armament O
to O
the O
Iapygian O
promontory O
and O
starting O
from O
thence O
touched O
at O
the O
Choerades O
Isles O
lying O
off O
Iapygia O
where O
they O
took O
on O
board O
a O
hundred O
and O
fifty O
Iapygian O
darters O
of O
the O
Messapian O
tribe O
and O
after O
renewing O
an O
old O
friendship O
with O
Artas O
the O
chief O
who O
had O
furnished O
them O
with O
the O
darters O
arrived O
at O
Metapontium O
in O
Italy. O
Here B-LOC
they O
persuaded O
their O
allies O
the O
Metapontines O
to O
send O
with O
them O
three O
hundred O
darters O
and O
two O
galleys O
and O
with O
this O
reinforcement O
coasted O
on O
to O
Thurii O
where O
they O
found O
the O
party O
hostile O
to O
Athens O
recently O
expelled O
by O
a O
revolution O
and O
accordingly O
remained O
there O
to O
muster O
and O
review O
the O
whole O
army O
to O
see O
if O
any O
had O
been O
left O
behind O
and O
to O
prevail O
upon O
the O
Thurians O
resolutely O
to O
join O
them O
in O
their O
expedition O
and O
in O
the O
circumstances O
in O
which O
they O
found O
themselves O
to O
conclude O
a O
defensive O
and O
offensive O
alliance O
with O
the O
Athenians. O
34About O
the O
same O
time O
the O
Peloponnesians O
in O
the O
twenty O
five O
ships O
stationed O
opposite O
to O
the O
squadron O
at O
Naupactus O
to O
protect O
the O
passage O
of O
the O
transports O
to O
Sicily O
had O
got O
ready O
for O
engaging O
and O
manning O
some O
additional O
vessels O
so O
as O
to O
be O
numerically O
little O
inferior O
to O
the O
Athenians O
anchored O
off O
Erineus O
in O
Achaia O
in O
the O
Rhypic O
country. O
The O
place O
off O
which O
they O
lay O
being O
in O
the O
form O
of O
a O
crescent O
the O
land O
forces O
furnished O
by O
the O
Corinthians O
and O
their O
allies O
on O
the O
spot O
came O
up O
and O
ranged O
themselves O
upon O
the O
projecting O
headlands O
on O
either O
side O
while O
the O
fleet O
under O
the O
command O
of O
Polyanthes O
a O
Corinthian O
held O
the O
intervening O
space O
and O
blocked O
up O
the O
entrance. O
The O
Athenians O
under O
Diphilus O
now O
sailed O
out O
against O
them O
with O
thirty O
three O
ships O
from B-LOC
Naupactus O
and O
the O
Corinthians O
at O
first O
not O
moving O
at O
length O
thought O
they O
saw O
their O
opportunity O
raised O
the O
signal O
and O
advanced O
and O
engaged O
the O
Athenians. O
After O
an O
obstinate O
struggle O
the O
Corinthians O
lost O
three O
ships O
and O
without O
sinking O
any O
altogether O
disabled O
seven O
of O
the O
enemy O
which O
were O
struck O
prow O
to O
prow O
and O
had O
their O
foreships O
stove O
in O
by O
the O
Corinthian O
vessels O
whose O
cheeks O
had O
been O
strengthened O
for O
this O
very O
purpose. O
After O
an O
action O
of O
this O
even O
character O
in O
which O
either O
party O
could O
claim O
the O
victory O
(although O
the O
Athenians O
became O
masters O
of O
the O
wrecks O
through O
the O
wind O
driving O
them O
out O
to O
sea O
the O
Corinthians O
not O
putting O
out O
again O
to O
meet O
them) O
the O
two O
combatants O
parted. O
No O
pursuit O
took O
place O
and O
no O
prisoners O
were O
made O
on O
either O
side; O
the O
Corinthians O
and O
Peloponnesians O
who O
were O
fighting O
near O
the O
shore O
escaping O
with O
ease O
and O
none O
of O
the O
Athenian O
vessels O
having O
been O
sunk. O
The O
Athenians O
now O
sailed O
back O
to O
Naupactus O
and O
the O
Corinthians O
immediately O
set O
up O
a O
trophy O
as O
victors O
because O
they O
had O
disabled O
a O
greater O
number O
of O
the O
enemy's O
ships. O
Moreover O
they O
held O
that O
they O
had O
not O
been O
worsted O
for O
the O
very O
same O
reason O
that O
their O
opponent O
held O
that O
he O
had O
not O
been O
victorious; O
the O
Corinthians O
considering O
that O
they O
were O
conquerors O
if O
not O
decidedly O
conquered O
and O
the O
Athenians O
thinking O
themselves O
vanquished O
because O
not O
decidedly O
victorious. O
However O
when O
the O
Peloponnesians O
sailed O
off O
and O
their O
land O
forces O
had O
dispersed O
the O
Athenians O
also O
set O
up O
a O
trophy O
as O
victors O
in O
Achaia O
about O
two O
miles O
and O
a O
quarter O
from O
Erineus O
the O
Corinthian O
station. O
This O
was O
the O
termination O
of O
the O
action O
at O
Naupactus. O
35To O
return O
to O
Demosthenes O
and O
Eurymedon O
the O
Thurians O
having O
now O
got O
ready O
to O
join O
in O
the O
expedition O
with O
seven O
hundred O
heavy O
infantry O
and O
three O
hundred O
darters O
the O
two O
generals O
ordered O
the O
ships O
to O
sail O
along O
the O
coast O
to O
the O
Crotonian O
territory O
and O
meanwhile O
held O
a O
review O
of O
all O
the O
land O
forces O
upon O
the O
river O
Sybaris O
and O
then O
led O
them O
through O
the O
Thurian O
country. O
Arrived O
at O
the O
river O
Hylias O
they O
here O
received O
a O
message O
from O
the O
Crotonians O
saying O
that O
they O
would O
not O
allow O
the O
army O
to O
pass O
through O
their O
country; O
upon O
which O
the O
Athenians O
descended O
towards O
the O
shore O
and O
bivouacked O
near O
the O
sea O
and O
the O
mouth O
of O
the O
Hylias O
where O
the O
fleet O
also O
met O
them O
and O
the O
next O
day O
embarked O
and O
sailed O
along O
the O
coast O
touching O
at O
all O
the O
cities O
except O
Locri O
until O
they O
came O
to O
Petra O
in O
the O
Rhegian O
territory. O
36Meanwhile O
the O
Syracusans O
hearing O
of O
their O
approach O
resolved O
to O
make O
a O
second O
attempt O
with O
their O
fleet O
and O
their O
other O
forces O
on O
shore O
which O
they O
had O
been O
collecting O
for O
this O
very O
purpose O
in O
order O
to O
do O
something O
before O
their O
arrival. O
In O
addition O
to O
other O
improvements O
suggested O
by O
the O
former O
sea O
fight O
which O
they O
now O
adopted O
in O
the O
equipment O
of O
their O
navy O
they O
cut O
down O
their O
prows O
to O
a O
smaller O
compass O
to O
make O
them O
more O
solid O
and O
made O
their O
cheeks O
stouter O
and O
from O
these O
let O
stays O
into O
the O
vessels' O
sides O
for O
a O
length O
of O
six O
cubits O
within O
and O
without O
in O
the O
same O
way O
as O
the O
Corinthians O
had O
altered O
their O
prows O
before O
engaging O
the O
squadron O
at O
Naupactus. O
The O
Syracusans O
thought O
that O
they O
would O
thus O
have O
an O
advantage O
over O
the O
Athenian O
vessels O
which O
were O
not O
constructed O
with O
equal O
strength O
but O
were O
slight O
in O
the O
bows O
from O
their O
being O
more O
used O
to O
sail O
round O
and O
charge O
the O
enemy's O
side O
than O
to O
meet O
him O
prow O
to O
prow O
and O
that O
the O
battle O
being O
in O
the O
great O
harbour O
with O
a O
great O
many O
ships O
in O
not O
much O
room O
was O
also O
a O
fact O
in O
their O
favour. O
Charging O
prow O
to O
prow O
they O
would O
stave O
in O
the O
enemy's O
bows O
by O
striking O
with O
solid O
and O
stout O
beaks O
against O
hollow O
and O
weak O
ones; O
and O
secondly O
the O
Athenians O
for O
want O
of O
room O
would O
be O
unable O
to O
use O
their O
favourite O
manoeuvre O
of O
breaking O
the O
line O
or O
of O
sailing O
round O
as O
the O
Syracusans O
would O
do O
their O
best O
not O
to O
let O
them O
do O
the O
one O
and O
want O
of O
room O
would O
prevent O
their O
doing O
the O
other. O
This O
charging O
prow O
to O
prow O
which O
had O
hitherto O
been O
thought O
want O
of O
skill O
in O
a O
helmsman O
would O
be O
the O
Syracusans' O
chief O
manoeuvre O
as O
being O
that O
which O
they O
should O
find O
most O
useful O
since O
the O
Athenians O
if O
repulsed O
would O
not O
be O
able O
to O
back O
water O
in O
any O
direction O
except O
towards O
the O
shore O
and O
that O
only O
for O
a O
little O
way O
and O
in O
the O
little O
space O
in O
front O
of O
their O
own O
camp. O
The O
rest O
of O
the O
harbour O
would O
be O
commanded O
by O
the O
Syracusans; O
and O
the O
Athenians O
if O
hard O
pressed O
by O
crowding O
together O
in O
a O
small O
space O
and O
all O
to O
the O
same O
point O
would O
run O
foul O
of O
one O
another O
and O
fall O
into O
disorder O
which O
was O
in O
fact O
the O
thing O
that O
did O
the O
Athenians O
most O
harm O
in O
all O
the O
sea O
fights O
they O
not O
having O
like O
the O
Syracusans O
the O
whole O
harbour O
to O
retreat O
over. O
As O
to O
their O
sailing O
round O
into O
the O
open O
sea O
this O
would O
be O
impossible O
with O
the O
Syracusans O
in O
possession O
of O
the O
way O
out O
and O
in O
especially O
as O
Plemmyrium O
would O
be O
hostile O
to O
them O
and O
the O
mouth O
of O
the O
harbour O
was O
not O
large. O
37With O
these O
contrivances O
to O
suit O
their O
skill O
and O
ability O
and O
now O
more O
confident O
after O
the O
previous O
sea O
fight O
the O
Syracusans O
attacked O
by O
land O
and O
sea O
at O
once. O
The O
town O
force O
Gylippus O
led O
out O
a O
little O
the O
first O
and O
brought O
them O
up O
to O
the O
wall O
of O
the O
Athenians O
where O
it O
looked O
towards O
the O
city O
while O
the O
force O
from O
the O
Olympieum O
that O
is O
to O
say O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
that O
were O
there O
with O
the O
horse O
and O
the O
light O
troops O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
advanced O
against O
the O
wall O
from O
the O
opposite O
side; O
the O
ships O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
allies O
sailing O
out O
immediately O
afterwards. O
The O
Athenians O
at O
first O
fancied O
that O
they O
were O
to O
be O
attacked O
by O
land O
only O
and O
it O
was O
not O
without O
alarm O
that O
they O
saw O
the O
fleet O
suddenly O
approaching O
as O
well; O
and O
while O
some O
were O
forming O
upon O
the O
walls O
and O
in O
front O
of O
them O
against O
the O
advancing O
enemy O
and O
some O
marching O
out O
in O
haste O
against O
the O
numbers O
of O
horse O
and O
darters O
coming O
from O
the O
Olympieum O
and O
from O
outside O
others O
manned O
the O
ships O
or O
rushed O
down O
to O
the O
beach O
to O
oppose O
the O
enemy O
and O
when O
the O
ships O
were O
manned O
put O
out O
with O
seventy O
five O
sail O
against O
about O
eighty O
of O
the O
Syracusans. O
38After O
spending O
a O
great O
part O
of O
the O
day O
in O
advancing O
and O
retreating O
and O
skirmishing O
with O
each O
other O
without O
either O
being O
able O
to O
gain O
any O
advantage O
worth O
speaking O
of O
except O
that O
the O
Syracusans O
sank O
one O
or O
two O
of O
the O
Athenian O
vessels O
they O
parted O
the O
land O
force O
at O
the O
same O
time O
retiring O
from O
the O
lines. O
The O
next O
day O
the O
Syracusans O
remained O
quiet O
and O
gave O
no O
signs O
of O
what O
they O
were O
going O
to O
do; O
but O
Nicias O
seeing O
that O
the O
battle O
had O
been O
a O
drawn O
one O
and O
expecting O
that O
they O
would O
attack O
again O
compelled O
the O
captains O
to O
refit O
any O
of O
the O
ships O
that O
had O
suffered O
and O
moored O
merchant O
vessels O
before O
the O
stockade O
which O
they O
had O
driven O
into O
the O
sea O
in O
front O
of O
their O
ships O
to O
serve O
instead O
of O
an O
enclosed O
harbour O
at O
about O
two O
hundred O
feet O
from O
each O
other O
in O
order O
that O
any O
ship O
that O
was O
hard O
pressed O
might O
be O
able O
to O
retreat O
in O
safety O
and O
sail O
out O
again O
at O
leisure. O
These O
preparations O
occupied O
the O
Athenians O
all O
day O
until O
nightfall. O
39The O
next O
day O
the O
Syracusans O
began O
operations O
at O
an O
earlier O
hour O
but O
with O
the O
same O
plan O
of O
attack O
by O
land O
and O
sea. O
A O
great O
part O
of O
the O
day O
the O
rivals O
spent O
as O
before O
confronting O
and O
skirmishing O
with O
each O
other; O
until O
at O
last O
Ariston O
son O
of O
Pyrrhicus O
a O
Corinthian O
the O
ablest O
helmsman O
in O
the O
Syracusan O
service O
persuaded O
their O
naval O
commanders O
to O
send O
to O
the O
officials O
in O
the O
city O
and O
tell O
them O
to O
move O
the O
sale O
market O
as O
quickly O
as O
they O
could O
down O
to O
the O
sea O
and O
oblige O
every O
one O
to O
bring O
whatever O
eatables O
he O
had O
and O
sell O
them O
there O
thus O
enabling O
the O
commanders O
to O
land O
the O
crews O
and O
dine O
at O
once O
close O
to O
the O
ships O
and O
shortly O
afterwards O
the O
selfsame O
day O
to O
attack O
the O
Athenians O
again O
when O
they O
were O
not O
expecting O
it. O
40In O
compliance O
with O
this O
advice O
a O
messenger O
was O
sent O
and O
the O
market O
got O
ready O
upon O
which O
the O
Syracusans O
suddenly O
backed O
water O
and O
withdrew O
to O
the O
town O
and O
at O
once O
landed O
and O
took O
their O
dinner O
upon O
the O
spot; O
while O
the O
Athenians O
supposing O
that O
they O
had O
returned O
to O
the O
town O
because O
they O
felt O
they O
were O
beaten O
disembarked O
at O
their O
leisure O
and O
set O
about O
getting O
their O
dinners O
and O
about O
their O
other O
occupations O
under O
the O
idea O
that O
they O
done O
with O
fighting O
for O
that O
day. O
Suddenly O
the O
Syracusans O
had O
manned O
their O
ships O
and O
again O
sailed O
against O
them; O
and O
the O
Athenians O
in O
great O
confusion O
and O
most O
of O
them O
fasting O
got O
on O
board O
and O
with O
great O
difficulty O
put O
out O
to O
meet O
them. O
For O
some O
time O
both O
parties O
remained O
on O
the O
defensive O
without O
engaging O
until O
the O
Athenians O
at O
last O
resolved O
not O
to O
let O
themselves O
be O
worn O
out O
by O
waiting O
where O
they O
were O
but O
to O
attack O
without O
delay O
and O
giving O
a O
cheer O
went O
into O
action. O
The O
Syracusans O
received O
them O
and O
charging O
prow O
to O
prow O
as O
they O
had O
intended O
stove O
in O
a O
great O
part O
of O
the O
Athenian O
foreships O
by O
the O
strength O
of O
their O
beaks; O
the O
darters O
on O
the O
decks O
also O
did O
great O
damage O
to O
the O
Athenians O
but O
still O
greater O
damage O
was O
done O
by O
the O
Syracusans O
who O
went O
about O
in O
small O
boats O
ran O
in O
upon O
the O
oars O
of O
the O
Athenian O
galleys O
and O
sailed O
against O
their O
sides O
and O
discharged O
from O
thence O
their O
darts O
upon O
the O
sailors. O
41At O
last O
fighting O
hard O
in O
this O
fashion O
the O
Syracusans O
gained O
the O
victory O
and O
the O
Athenians O
turned O
and O
fled O
between O
the O
merchantmen O
to O
their O
own O
station. O
The O
Syracusan O
ships O
pursued O
them O
as O
far O
as O
the O
merchantmen O
where O
they O
were O
stopped O
by O
the O
beams O
armed O
with O
dolphins O
suspended O
from O
those O
vessels O
over O
the O
passage. O
Two O
of O
the O
Syracusan O
vessels O
went O
too O
near O
in O
the O
excitement O
of O
victory O
and O
were O
destroyed O
one O
of O
them O
being O
taken O
with O
its O
crew. O
After O
sinking O
seven O
of O
the O
Athenian O
vessels O
and O
disabling O
many O
and O
taking O
most O
of O
the O
men O
prisoners O
and O
killing O
others O
the O
Syracusans O
retired O
and O
set O
up O
trophies O
for O
both O
the O
engagements O
being O
now O
confident O
of O
having O
a O
decided O
superiority O
by O
sea O
and O
by O
no O
means O
despairing O
of O
equal O
success O
by O
land. O
Nineteenth O
Year O
of O
the O
War O
Arrival O
of O
Demosthenes O
Defeat O
of O
the O
Athenians O
at O
Epipolae O
Folly O
and O
Obstinancy O
of O
Nicias[edit] O
42In O
the O
meantime O
while O
the O
Syracusans O
were O
preparing O
for O
a O
second O
attack O
upon O
both O
elements O
Demosthenes O
and O
Eurymedon O
arrived O
with O
the O
succours O
from O
Athens O
consisting O
of O
about O
seventy O
three O
ships O
including O
the O
foreigners; O
nearly O
five O
thousand O
heavy O
infantry O
Athenian O
and O
allied; O
a O
large O
number O
of O
darters O
Hellenic O
and O
barbarian O
and O
slingers O
and O
archers O
and O
everything O
else O
upon O
a O
corresponding O
scale. O
The O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
were O
for O
the O
moment O
not O
a O
little O
dismayed O
at O
the O
idea O
that O
there O
was O
to O
be O
no O
term O
or O
ending O
to O
their O
dangers O
seeing O
in O
spite O
of O
the O
fortification O
of O
Decelea O
a O
new O
army O
arrive O
nearly O
equal O
to O
the O
former O
and O
the O
power O
of O
Athens O
proving O
so O
great O
in O
every O
quarter. O
On O
the O
other O
hand O
the O
first O
Athenian O
armament O
regained O
a O
certain O
confidence O
in O
the O
midst O
of O
its O
misfortunes. O
Demosthenes O
seeing O
how O
matters O
stood O
felt O
that B-PER
he O
could O
not O
drag O
on O
and O
fare O
as O
Nicias O
had O
done O
who O
by O
wintering O
in O
Catana O
instead O
of O
at O
once O
attacking O
Syracuse O
had O
allowed O
the O
terror O
of O
his O
first O
arrival O
to O
evaporate O
in O
contempt O
and O
had O
given O
time O
to O
Gylippus O
to O
arrive O
with O
a O
force O
from O
Peloponnese O
which O
the O
Syracusans O
would O
never O
have O
sent O
for O
if O
he O
had O
attacked O
immediately; O
for O
they O
fancied O
that O
they O
were O
a O
match O
for O
him O
by O
themselves O
and O
would O
not O
have O
discovered O
their O
inferiority O
until O
they O
were O
already O
invested O
and O
even O
if O
they O
then O
sent O
for O
succours O
they O
would O
no O
longer O
have O
been O
equally O
able O
to O
profit O
by O
their O
arrival. O
Recollecting O
this O
and O
well O
aware O
that O
it O
was O
now O
on O
the O
first O
day O
after O
his O
arrival O
that O
he O
like O
Nicias O
was O
most O
formidable O
to O
the O
enemy O
Demosthenes O
determined O
to O
lose O
no O
time O
in O
drawing O
the O
utmost B-PER
profit O
from O
the O
consternation O
at O
the O
moment O
inspired O
by O
his O
army; O
and B-LOC
seeing I-LOC
that O
the O
counterwall O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
which O
hindered O
the O
Athenians O
from O
investing O
them O
was O
a O
single O
one O
and O
that O
he O
who O
should O
become O
master O
of O
the O
way O
up O
to O
Epipolae O
and O
afterwards O
of O
the O
camp O
there O
would O
find O
no O
difficulty O
in O
taking O
it O
as O
no O
one O
would O
even O
wait O
for O
his O
attack O
made O
all O
haste O
to O
attempt O
the O
enterprise. O
This O
he O
took O
to O
be O
the O
shortest O
way O
of O
ending O
the O
war O
as O
he O
would O
either O
succeed O
and O
take O
Syracuse O
or O
would O
lead O
back O
the O
armament O
instead O
of O
frittering O
away O
the O
lives O
of O
the O
Athenians O
engaged O
in O
the O
expedition O
and O
the O
resources O
of O
the O
country O
at O
large. O
First B-PER
therefore O
the O
Athenians O
went O
out O
and O
laid O
waste O
the O
lands O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
about O
the O
Anapus O
and O
carried O
all O
before O
them O
as O
at O
first O
by O
land O
and O
by O
sea O
the O
Syracusans O
not O
offering O
to O
oppose O
them O
upon O
either O
element O
unless O
it O
were O
with O
their O
cavalry O
and O
darters O
from O
the O
Olympieum. O
43Next O
Demosthenes O
resolved O
to O
attempt O
the O
counterwall O
first O
by O
means O
of O
engines. O
As O
however O
the O
engines O
that O
he O
brought O
up O
were O
burnt O
by O
the O
enemy O
fighting O
from O
the O
wall O
and O
the O
rest O
of O
the O
forces O
repulsed O
after O
attacking O
at O
many O
different O
points O
he O
determined O
to O
delay O
no O
longer O
and O
having O
obtained O
the O
consent O
of O
Nicias O
and O
his O
fellow O
commanders O
proceeded O
to O
put O
in O
execution O
his O
plan O
of O
attacking O
Epipolae. O
As O
by O
day O
it O
seemed O
impossible O
to O
approach O
and O
get O
up O
without O
being O
observed O
he O
ordered O
provisions O
for O
five O
days O
took O
all O
the O
masons O
and O
carpenters O
and O
other O
things O
such O
as O
arrows O
and O
everything O
else O
that O
they O
could O
want O
for O
the O
work O
of O
fortification O
if O
successful O
and O
after O
the O
first O
watch O
set O
out O
with O
Eurymedon O
and O
Menander O
and O
the O
whole O
army O
for O
Epipolae O
Nicias O
being O
left O
behind O
in O
the O
lines. O
Having O
come O
up O
by O
the O
hill O
of O
Euryelus O
(where O
the O
former O
army O
had O
ascended O
at O
first) O
unobserved O
by O
the O
enemy's O
guards O
they O
went O
up O
to O
the O
fort O
which O
the O
Syracusans O
had O
there O
and O
took O
it O
and O
put O
to O
the O
sword O
part O
of O
the O
garrison. O
The O
greater O
number O
however O
escaped O
at O
once O
and O
gave B-PER
the O
alarm O
to O
the O
camps O
of O
which O
there O
were O
three O
upon O
Epipolae O
defended O
by O
outworks O
one O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
one O
of O
the O
other O
Siceliots O
and O
one O
of O
the O
allies; O
and O
also O
to O
the O
six O
hundred O
Syracusans O
forming O
the O
original O
garrison O
for O
this O
part O
of O
Epipolae. O
These O
at O
once O
advanced O
against O
the O
assailants O
and O
falling O
in O
with O
Demosthenes O
and O
the O
Athenians O
were O
routed O
by O
them O
after O
a O
sharp O
resistance O
the O
victors O
immediately B-PER
pushing O
on O
eager O
to O
achieve O
the O
objects O
of O
the B-PER
attack O
without O
giving O
time O
for O
their O
ardour O
to O
cool; O
meanwhile O
others O
from O
the O
very O
beginning O
were O
taking O
the O
counterwall O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
which O
was O
abandoned O
by O
its O
garrison O
and O
pulling O
down O
the O
battlements. O
The O
Syracusans O
and O
the O
allies O
and O
Gylippus O
with O
the O
troops O
under O
his O
command O
advanced O
to O
the O
rescue O
from O
the O
outworks O
but O
engaged O
in O
some O
consternation O
(a O
night O
attack O
being O
a O
piece O
of O
audacity O
which O
they O
had O
never O
expected) O
and O
were O
at O
first O
compelled O
to O
retreat. O
But O
while O
the O
Athenians O
flushed O
with O
their O
victory O
now O
advanced O
with O
less O
order O
wishing O
to O
make O
their O
way O
as O
quickly O
as O
possible O
through O
the O
whole O
force O
of O
the O
enemy O
not O
yet O
engaged O
without O
relaxing O
their O
attack O
or O
giving O
them O
time O
to O
rally O
the O
Boeotians O
made O
the O
first O
stand O
against O
them O
attacked O
them O
routed O
them O
and O
put O
them O
to O
flight. O
44The O
Athenians O
now O
fell O
into O
great O
disorder O
and O
perplexity O
so O
that O
it O
was O
not O
easy O
to O
get O
from O
one O
side O
or O
the O
other O
any O
detailed O
account O
of O
the O
affair. O
By O
day O
certainly O
the O
combatants O
have O
a O
clearer O
notion O
though O
even O
then O
by O
no O
means O
of O
all O
that O
takes O
place O
no O
one O
knowing O
much O
of O
anything O
that O
does O
not O
go O
on O
in O
his O
own O
immediate O
neighbourhood; O
but O
in O
a O
night O
engagement O
(and O
this O
was O
the O
only O
one O
that O
occurred O
between O
great O
armies O
during O
the O
war) O
how O
could O
any O
one O
know O
anything O
for O
certain O
Although O
there O
was O
a O
bright O
moon O
they O
saw O
each O
other O
only O
as O
men O
do O
by O
moonlight O
that O
is O
to O
say O
they O
could O
distinguish O
the O
form O
of O
the O
body O
but O
could O
not O
tell O
for O
certain O
whether O
it O
was O
a O
friend O
or O
an O
enemy. O
Both O
had O
great O
numbers O
of O
heavy O
infantry O
moving O
about O
in O
a O
small O
space. O
Some O
of O
the O
Athenians O
were O
already O
defeated O
while O
others O
were O
coming O
up O
yet O
unconquered O
for O
their O
first O
attack. O
A O
large O
part O
also O
of O
the O
rest O
of O
their O
forces O
either O
had O
only O
just O
got O
up O
or O
were O
still O
ascending O
so O
that O
they O
did O
not O
know O
which O
way O
to O
march. O
Owing O
to O
the O
rout O
that O
had O
taken O
place O
all O
in O
front O
was O
now O
in O
confusion O
and O
the O
noise O
made O
it O
difficult O
to O
distinguish O
anything. O
The O
victorious O
Syracusans O
and O
allies O
were O
cheering O
each O
other O
on O
with O
loud O
cries O
by O
night O
the O
only O
possible O
means O
of O
communication O
and O
meanwhile O
receiving O
all O
who O
came O
against O
them; O
while O
the O
Athenians O
were O
seeking O
for O
one O
another O
taking O
all O
in O
front O
of O
them O
for O
enemies O
even O
although O
they O
might O
be O
some O
of O
their O
now O
flying O
friends; O
and O
by O
constantly O
asking O
for O
the O
watchword O
which O
was O
their O
only O
means O
of O
recognition O
not O
only O
caused O
great O
confusion O
among O
themselves O
by O
asking O
all O
at O
once O
but O
also O
made O
it O
known O
to O
the O
enemy O
whose O
own O
they O
did O
not O
so O
readily O
discover O
as O
the O
Syracusans O
were O
victorious O
and O
not O
scattered O
and O
thus O
less O
easily O
mistaken. O
The O
result O
was O
that O
if O
the O
Athenians O
fell O
in O
with O
a O
party O
of O
the O
enemy O
that O
was O
weaker O
than O
they O
it O
escaped O
them O
through O
knowing O
their O
watchword; O
while O
if O
they O
themselves O
failed O
to O
answer O
they O
were O
put O
to O
the O
sword. O
But O
what O
hurt O
them O
as O
much O
or O
indeed O
more O
than O
anything O
else O
was O
the O
singing O
of O
the O
paean O
from O
the O
perplexity O
which O
it O
caused O
by O
being O
nearly O
the O
same O
on O
either O
side; O
the O
Argives O
and O
Corcyraeans O
and O
any O
other O
Dorian O
peoples O
in O
the O
army O
struck O
terror O
into O
the O
Athenians O
whenever O
they O
raised O
their O
paean O
no O
less O
than O
did O
the O
enemy. O
Thus O
after O
being O
once O
thrown O
into O
disorder O
they O
ended O
by O
coming O
into O
collision O
with O
each O
other O
in O
many O
parts O
of O
the O
field O
friends O
with O
friends O
and O
citizens O
with O
citizens O
and O
not O
only O
terrified O
one O
another O
but O
even O
came O
to O
blows O
and O
could O
only O
be O
parted O
with O
difficulty. O
In O
the O
pursuit O
many O
perished O
by O
throwing O
themselves O
down O
the O
cliffs O
the O
way O
down O
from O
Epipolae O
being O
narrow; O
and O
of O
those O
who O
got O
down O
safely O
into O
the O
plain O
although O
many O
especially O
those O
who O
belonged O
to O
the O
first O
armament O
escaped O
through O
their O
better O
acquaintance O
with O
the O
locality O
some O
of O
the O
newcomers O
lost O
their O
way O
and O
wandered O
over O
the O
country O
and O
were O
cut O
off O
in O
the O
morning O
by O
the O
Syracusan O
cavalry O
and O
killed. O
45The O
next O
day O
the O
Syracusans O
set O
up O
two O
trophies O
one O
upon O
Epipolae O
where O
the O
ascent O
had O
been O
made O
and O
the O
other O
on O
the O
spot O
where O
the O
first O
check O
was O
given O
by O
the O
Boeotians; O
and O
the O
Athenians O
took O
back O
their O
dead O
under O
truce. O
A O
great O
many O
of O
the O
Athenians O
and O
allies O
were O
killed O
although O
still O
more O
arms O
were O
taken O
than O
could O
be O
accounted O
for O
by O
the O
number O
of O
the O
dead O
as O
some O
of O
those O
who O
were O
obliged O
to O
leap O
down O
from O
the O
cliffs O
without O
their O
shields O
escaped O
with O
their O
lives O
and O
did O
not O
perish O
like O
the O
rest. O
46After O
this O
the O
Syracusans O
recovering O
their O
old O
confidence O
at O
such O
an O
unexpected O
stroke O
of O
good O
fortune O
dispatched O
Sicanus O
with O
fifteen O
ships O
to O
Agrigentum O
where O
there O
was O
a O
revolution O
to O
induce O
if O
possible O
the O
city O
to O
join O
them; O
while O
Gylippus O
again O
went O
by O
land O
into O
the O
rest O
of O
Sicily O
to O
bring O
up O
reinforcements O
being O
now O
in O
hope O
of O
taking O
the O
Athenian O
lines O
by O
storm O
after O
the O
result O
of O
the O
affair O
on O
Epipolae. O
47In O
the O
meantime O
the O
Athenian O
generals O
consulted O
upon O
the O
disaster O
which O
had O
happened O
and O
upon O
the O
general O
weakness O
of O
the O
army. O
They O
saw O
themselves O
unsuccessful O
in O
their O
enterprises O
and O
the O
soldiers O
disgusted O
with O
their O
stay; O
disease O
being O
rife O
among O
them O
owing O
to O
its O
being O
the O
sickly O
season O
of O
the O
year O
and O
to O
the O
marshy O
and O
unhealthy O
nature O
of O
the O
spot O
in O
which O
they O
were O
encamped; O
and O
the O
state O
of O
their O
affairs O
generally O
being O
thought O
desperate. O
Accordingly O
Demosthenes O
was O
of O
opinion O
that O
they O
ought O
not O
to O
stay O
any O
longer; O
but O
agreeably O
to O
his O
original O
idea O
in O
risking O
the O
attempt O
upon O
Epipolae O
now O
that O
this O
had O
failed O
he O
gave O
his O
vote O
for O
going O
away O
without O
further O
loss O
of O
time O
while O
the O
sea O
might O
yet O
be O
crossed O
and O
their O
late O
reinforcement O
might O
give O
them O
the O
superiority O
at O
all O
events O
on O
that O
element. O
He O
also O
said O
that O
it O
would O
be O
more O
profitable O
for O
the O
state O
to O
carry O
on O
the O
war O
against O
those O
who O
were O
building O
fortifications O
in O
Attica O
than O
against O
the O
Syracusans O
whom O
it O
was O
no O
longer O
easy O
to O
subdue; O
besides O
which O
it O
was O
not O
right O
to O
squander O
large O
sums O
of O
money O
to O
no O
purpose O
by O
going O
on O
with O
the O
siege. O
48This O
was O
the O
opinion O
of O
Demosthenes. O
Nicias O
without O
denying O
the O
bad O
state O
of O
their O
affairs O
was O
unwilling O
to O
avow O
their O
weakness O
or O
to O
have O
it O
reported O
to O
the O
enemy O
that O
the O
Athenians O
in O
full O
council O
were O
openly O
voting O
for O
retreat; O
for O
in O
that O
case O
they O
would O
be O
much O
less O
likely O
to O
effect O
it O
when O
they O
wanted O
without O
discovery. O
Moreover O
his O
own O
particular O
information O
still O
gave O
him O
reason O
to O
hope O
that O
the O
affairs O
of O
the O
enemy O
would O
soon O
be O
in O
a O
worse O
state O
than O
their O
own O
if O
the O
Athenians O
persevered O
in O
the O
siege; O
as O
they O
would O
wear O
out O
the O
Syracusans O
by O
want O
of O
money O
especially O
with O
the O
more O
extensive O
command O
of O
the O
sea O
now O
given O
them O
by O
their O
present O
navy. O
Besides O
this O
there O
was O
a O
party O
in O
Syracuse O
who O
wished O
to O
betray O
the O
city O
to O
the O
Athenians O
and O
kept O
sending O
him O
messages O
and O
telling O
him O
not O
to O
raise O
the O
siege. O
Accordingly O
knowing O
this O
and O
really O
waiting O
because O
he O
hesitated O
between O
the O
two O
courses O
and O
wished O
to O
see O
his O
way O
more O
clearly O
in O
his O
public O
speech O
on O
this O
occasion O
he O
refused O
to O
lead O
off O
the O
army O
saying O
he O
was O
sure O
the O
Athenians O
would O
never O
approve O
of O
their O
returning O
without O
a O
vote O
of O
theirs. O
Those O
who O
would O
vote O
upon O
their O
conduct O
instead O
of O
judging O
the O
facts O
as O
eye O
witnesses O
like O
themselves O
and O
not O
from O
what O
they O
might O
hear O
from O
hostile O
critics O
would O
simply O
be O
guided O
by O
the O
calumnies O
of O
the O
first O
clever O
speaker; O
while O
many O
indeed O
most O
of O
the O
soldiers O
on O
the O
spot O
who O
now O
so O
loudly O
proclaimed O
the O
danger O
of O
their O
position O
when O
they O
reached O
Athens O
would O
proclaim O
just O
as O
loudly O
the O
opposite O
and O
would O
say O
that O
their O
generals O
had O
been O
bribed O
to B-LOC
betray O
them O
and O
return. O
For O
himself O
therefore O
who O
knew O
the O
Athenian O
temper O
sooner O
than O
perish O
under O
a O
dishonourable O
charge O
and O
by O
an O
unjust O
sentence O
at O
the O
hands O
of O
the O
Athenians O
he O
would O
rather O
take O
his O
chance O
and O
die O
if O
die O
he O
must O
a O
soldier's O
death O
at O
the O
hand O
of O
the O
enemy. O
Besides O
after O
all O
the O
Syracusans O
were O
in O
a O
worse O
case O
than O
themselves. O
What O
with O
paying O
mercenaries O
spending O
upon O
fortified O
posts O
and O
now O
for O
a O
full O
year O
maintaining O
a O
large O
navy O
they O
were O
already O
at O
a O
loss O
and O
would O
soon O
be O
at O
a O
standstill O
they O
had O
already O
spent O
two O
thousand O
talents O
and O
incurred O
heavy O
debts O
besides O
and O
could O
not O
lose O
even O
ever O
so O
small O
a O
fraction O
of O
their O
present O
force O
through O
not O
paying O
it O
without O
ruin O
to O
their O
cause; O
depending O
as O
they O
did O
more O
upon O
mercenaries O
than O
upon O
soldiers O
obliged O
to O
serve O
like O
their O
own. O
He O
therefore O
said O
that O
they O
ought O
to O
stay O
and O
carry O
on O
the O
siege O
and O
not O
depart O
defeated O
in O
point O
of O
money O
in O
which O
they O
were O
much O
superior. O
49Nicias O
spoke O
positively O
because O
he O
had O
exact O
information O
of O
the O
financial O
distress O
at O
Syracuse O
and O
also O
because O
of O
the O
strength O
of O
the O
Athenian O
party O
there O
which O
kept O
sending O
him O
messages O
not O
to O
raise O
the O
siege; O
besides O
which O
he O
had O
more O
confidence O
than O
before O
in O
his O
fleet O
and O
felt O
sure O
at O
least O
of O
its O
success. O
Demosthenes O
however O
would O
not O
hear O
for O
a O
moment O
of O
continuing O
the O
siege O
but O
said O
that O
if O
they O
could O
not O
lead O
off O
the O
army O
without O
a O
decree O
from O
Athens O
and O
if O
they O
were O
obliged O
to O
stay O
on O
they O
ought O
to O
remove O
to O
Thapsus O
or O
Catana; O
where O
their O
land O
forces O
would O
have O
a O
wide O
extent O
of O
country O
to O
overrun O
and O
could O
live O
by O
plundering O
the O
enemy O
and O
would O
thus O
do O
them O
damage; O
while O
the O
fleet O
would O
have O
the O
open O
sea O
to O
fight O
in O
that O
is O
to O
say O
instead O
of O
a O
narrow O
space O
which O
was O
all O
in O
the O
enemy's O
favour O
a O
wide O
sea O
room O
where O
their O
science O
would O
be O
of O
use O
and O
where O
they O
could O
retreat O
or O
advance O
without O
being O
confined O
or O
circumscribed O
either O
when O
they O
put O
out O
or O
put O
in. O
In O
any O
case O
he O
was O
altogether O
opposed O
to O
their O
staying O
on O
where O
they O
were O
and O
insisted O
on O
removing O
at O
once O
as O
quickly O
and O
with O
as O
little O
delay O
as O
possible; O
and O
in O
this O
judgment O
Eurymedon O
agreed. O
Nicias O
however O
still O
objecting O
a O
certain O
diffidence O
and O
hesitation O
came O
over O
them O
with O
a O
suspicion O
that O
Nicias O
might O
have O
some O
further O
information O
to O
make O
him O
so O
positive. O
Nineteenth O
Year O
of O
the O
War O
Battles O
in O
the O
Great O
Harbour O
Retreat O
and O
Annihilation O
of O
the O
Athenian O
Army[edit] O
50While O
the O
Athenians O
lingered O
on O
in O
this O
way O
without O
moving O
from O
where O
they O
were O
Gylippus O
and O
Sicanus O
now O
arrived O
at O
Syracuse. O
Sicanus O
had O
failed O
to O
gain O
Agrigentum O
the O
party O
friendly O
to O
the O
Syracusans O
having O
been O
driven O
out O
while O
he O
was O
still O
at O
Gela; O
but O
Gylippus O
was O
accompanied O
not O
only O
by O
a O
large O
number O
of O
troops O
raised O
in O
Sicily O
but O
by O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
sent O
off O
in O
the O
spring O
from O
Peloponnese O
in O
the O
merchantmen O
who O
had O
arrived O
at O
Selinus O
from O
Libya. O
They O
had O
been O
carried O
to O
Libya O
by O
a O
storm O
and O
having O
obtained O
two O
galleys O
and O
pilots O
from O
the O
Cyrenians O
on O
their O
voyage O
alongshore O
had O
taken O
sides O
with O
the O
Euesperitae B-PER
and O
had B-PER
defeated I-PER
the O
Libyans O
who O
were O
besieging O
them O
and O
from O
thence O
coasting O
on O
to O
Neapolis O
a O
Carthaginian O
mart O
and B-PER
the O
nearest O
point O
to O
Sicily O
from O
which O
it O
is O
only O
two O
days' O
and O
a O
night's O
voyage O
there O
crossed O
over O
and O
came O
to O
Selinus. O
Immediately O
upon O
their O
arrival O
the O
Syracusans O
prepared O
to O
attack O
the O
Athenians O
again O
by O
land O
and O
sea O
at O
once. O
The O
Athenian O
generals O
seeing O
a O
fresh O
army O
come O
to O
the O
aid O
of O
the O
enemy O
and O
that O
their O
own O
circumstances O
far O
from O
improving O
were O
becoming O
daily O
worse O
and O
above O
all O
distressed O
by O
the O
sickness O
of O
the O
soldiers O
now O
began O
to O
repent O
of O
not O
having O
removed O
before; O
and O
Nicias O
no O
longer O
offering O
the O
same O
opposition O
except O
by O
urging O
that O
there O
should O
be O
no O
open O
voting O
they O
gave O
orders O
as O
secretly O
as O
possible O
for O
all O
to O
be O
prepared O
to O
sail O
out O
from O
the O
camp O
at O
a O
given O
signal. O
All O
was O
at O
last O
ready O
and O
they O
were O
on O
the O
point O
of O
sailing O
away O
when O
an O
eclipse O
of O
the O
moon O
which O
was O
then O
at O
the O
full O
took O
place. O
Most O
of O
the O
Athenians O
deeply O
impressed O
by O
this O
occurrence O
now O
urged O
the O
generals O
to O
wait; O
and O
Nicias O
who O
was O
somewhat O
over O
addicted O
to O
divination O
and O
practices O
of O
that O
kind O
refused O
from O
that O
moment O
even O
to O
take O
the O
question O
of O
departure O
into O
consideration O
until O
they O
had O
waited O
the O
thrice O
nine O
days O
prescribed O
by O
the O
soothsayers. O
51The O
besiegers O
were O
thus O
condemned O
to O
stay O
in O
the O
country; O
and O
the O
Syracusans O
getting O
wind O
of O
what O
had O
happened O
became O
more O
eager O
than O
ever O
to O
press O
the O
Athenians O
who O
had O
now O
themselves O
acknowledged O
that O
they O
were O
no O
longer O
their O
superiors O
either O
by O
sea O
or O
by O
land O
as B-PER
otherwise I-PER
they O
would O
never O
have O
planned O
to O
sail O
away. O
Besides O
which O
the O
Syracusans O
did O
not O
wish O
them O
to O
settle O
in O
any O
other O
part O
of O
Sicily O
where O
they O
would O
be O
more O
difficult O
to O
deal O
with O
but O
desired O
to O
force O
them O
to O
fight O
at O
sea O
as O
quickly O
as O
possible O
in O
a O
position O
favourable O
to O
themselves. O
Accordingly O
they O
manned O
their O
ships O
and O
practised O
for O
as O
many O
days O
as O
they O
thought O
sufficient. O
When O
the O
moment O
arrived O
they O
assaulted O
on O
the O
first O
day O
the O
Athenian O
lines O
and O
upon O
a O
small O
force O
of O
heavy O
infantry O
and O
horse O
sallying O
out O
against O
them O
by O
certain O
gates O
cut O
off O
some O
of O
the O
former O
and O
routed O
and O
pursued O
them O
to O
the O
lines O
where O
as O
the O
entrance O
was O
narrow O
the O
Athenians O
lost O
seventy O
horses O
and O
some O
few O
of O
the O
heavy O
infantry. O
52Drawing O
off O
their O
troops O
for O
this O
day O
on O
the O
next O
the O
Syracusans O
went O
out O
with O
a O
fleet O
of O
seventy O
six O
sail O
and O
at O
the O
same O
time O
advanced O
with O
their O
land O
forces O
against O
the O
lines. O
The O
Athenians O
put O
out O
to O
meet O
them O
with O
eighty O
six O
ships O
came O
to O
close O
quarters O
and O
engaged. O
The O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
first O
defeated O
the O
Athenian O
centre O
and O
then O
caught O
Eurymedon O
the O
commander O
of O
the O
right O
wing O
who O
was O
sailing O
out O
from O
the O
line O
more O
towards O
the O
land O
in O
order O
to O
surround O
the O
enemy O
in O
the O
hollow O
and O
recess O
of O
the O
harbour O
and O
killed O
him O
and O
destroyed O
the O
ships O
accompanying O
him; O
after O
which O
they O
now O
chased O
the O
whole O
Athenian O
fleet O
before O
them O
and O
drove O
them O
ashore. O
53Gylippus O
seeing O
the O
enemy's O
fleet O
defeated O
and O
carried O
ashore O
beyond O
their O
stockades O
and O
camp O
ran O
down O
to O
the O
breakwater O
with O
some O
of O
his O
troops O
in O
order O
to O
cut O
off O
the O
men O
as O
they O
landed O
and O
make O
it O
easier O
for O
the O
Syracusans O
to O
tow O
off O
the O
vessels O
by O
the O
shore O
being O
friendly O
ground. O
The O
Tyrrhenians O
who O
guarded O
this O
point O
for O
the O
Athenians O
seeing O
them O
come O
on O
in O
disorder O
advanced O
out O
against O
them O
and O
attacked O
and O
routed O
their O
van O
hurling O
it O
into O
the O
marsh O
of O
Lysimeleia. O
Afterwards O
the O
Syracusan O
and O
allied O
troops O
arrived O
in O
greater O
numbers O
and O
the O
Athenians O
fearing O
for O
their O
ships O
came O
up O
also O
to O
the O
rescue O
and O
engaged O
them O
and O
defeated O
and O
pursued B-PER
them O
to O
some O
distance O
and O
killed O
a O
few O
of O
their O
heavy O
infantry. O
They O
succeeded O
in O
rescuing O
most O
of O
their O
ships O
and O
brought O
them O
down O
by O
their O
camp; O
eighteen O
however O
were O
taken O
by O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
and O
all O
the O
men O
killed. O
The O
rest O
the O
enemy O
tried O
to O
burn O
by O
means O
of O
an O
old O
merchantman O
which O
they O
filled O
with O
faggots O
and O
pine O
wood O
set O
on O
fire O
and O
let O
drift O
down O
the O
wind O
which O
blew O
full O
on O
the O
Athenians. O
The O
Athenians O
however O
alarmed O
for O
their O
ships O
contrived O
means O
for O
stopping O
it O
and O
putting O
it O
out O
and O
checking O
the O
flames O
and O
the O
nearer O
approach O
of O
the O
merchantman O
thus O
escaped O
the O
danger. O
54After O
this O
the O
Syracusans O
set O
up O
a O
trophy O
for O
the O
sea O
fight O
and O
for O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
whom O
they O
had O
cut O
off O
up O
at O
the O
lines O
where O
they O
took O
the O
horses; O
and O
the O
Athenians O
for O
the O
rout O
of O
the O
foot O
driven O
by O
the O
Tyrrhenians O
into O
the O
marsh O
and O
for O
their O
own O
victory O
with O
the O
rest O
of O
the O
army. O
55The O
Syracusans O
had O
now O
gained O
a O
decisive O
victory O
at O
sea O
where O
until O
now O
they O
had O
feared O
the O
reinforcement O
brought O
by O
Demosthenes O
and O
deep O
in O
consequence O
was O
the O
despondency O
of O
the O
Athenians O
and O
great O
their O
disappointment O
and O
greater O
still O
their O
regret O
for O
having O
come O
on O
the O
expedition. O
These O
were O
the O
only O
cities O
that O
they O
had O
yet O
encountered O
similar O
to O
their O
own O
in O
character O
under O
democracies O
like O
themselves O
which O
had O
ships O
and O
horses O
and O
were O
of O
considerable O
magnitude. O
They O
had O
been O
unable O
to O
divide O
and O
bring O
them O
over O
by O
holding O
out O
the O
prospect O
of O
changes O
in O
their O
governments O
or O
to O
crush O
them O
by O
their O
great O
superiority O
in O
force O
but O
had O
failed O
in O
most O
of O
their O
attempts O
and O
being O
already O
in O
perplexity O
had O
now O
been O
defeated O
at O
sea O
where O
defeat O
could O
never O
have O
been O
expected O
and O
were O
thus O
plunged O
deeper O
in O
embarrassment O
than O
ever. O
56Meanwhile O
the O
Syracusans O
immediately O
began O
to O
sail O
freely O
along O
the O
harbour O
and O
determined O
to O
close O
up O
its O
mouth O
so O
that O
the O
Athenians O
might O
not O
be O
able O
to O
steal O
out O
in O
future O
even O
if O
they O
wished. O
Indeed O
the O
Syracusans O
no O
longer O
thought O
only O
of O
saving O
themselves O
but O
also O
how O
to O
hinder O
the O
escape O
of O
the O
enemy; O
thinking O
and O
thinking O
rightly O
that O
they O
were O
now O
much O
the O
stronger O
and O
that O
to O
conquer O
the O
Athenians O
and O
their O
allies O
by O
land O
and O
sea O
would O
win O
them O
great O
glory O
in O
Hellas. O
The O
rest O
of O
the O
Hellenes O
would O
thus O
immediately O
be O
either O
freed O
or O
released O
from O
apprehension O
as O
the O
remaining O
forces O
of O
Athens O
would O
be O
henceforth O
unable O
to O
sustain O
the O
war O
that O
would O
be O
waged O
against O
her; O
while O
they O
the O
Syracusans O
would O
be O
regarded O
as O
the O
authors O
of O
this O
deliverance O
and O
would O
be O
held O
in O
high O
admiration O
not O
only O
with O
all O
men O
now O
living O
but O
also O
with O
posterity. O
Nor O
were O
these O
the O
only O
considerations O
that O
gave O
dignity O
to O
the O
struggle. O
They O
would O
thus O
conquer O
not O
only O
the O
Athenians O
but O
also O
their O
numerous O
allies O
and O
conquer O
not O
alone O
but O
with O
their O
companions O
in O
arms O
commanding O
side O
by O
side O
with O
the O
Corinthians O
and O
Lacedaemonians O
having O
offered O
their O
city O
to O
stand O
in O
the O
van O
of O
danger O
and O
having O
been O
in O
a O
great O
measure O
the O
pioneers O
of O
naval O
success. O
Indeed O
there O
were O
never O
so O
many O
peoples O
assembled O
before O
a O
single O
city O
if O
we O
except O
the O
grand O
total O
gathered O
together O
in O
this O
war O
under O
Athens O
and O
Lacedaemon.57The O
following O
were O
the O
states O
on O
either O
side O
who O
came O
to O
Syracuse O
to O
fight O
for O
or O
against O
Sicily O
to O
help O
to O
conquer O
or O
defend O
the O
island. O
Right O
or O
community O
of O
blood O
was O
not O
the O
bond O
of O
union O
between O
them O
so O
much O
as O
interest O
or O
compulsion O
as O
the O
case O
might O
be. O
The O
Athenians O
themselves O
being O
Ionians O
went O
against O
the O
Dorians O
of O
Syracuse O
of O
their O
own O
free O
will; O
and O
the O
peoples O
still O
speaking O
Attic O
and O
using O
the O
Athenian O
laws O
the O
Lemnians O
Imbrians O
and O
Aeginetans O
that O
is O
to O
say O
the O
then O
occupants O
of O
Aegina O
being O
their O
colonists O
went O
with O
them. O
To O
these O
must O
be O
also O
added O
the O
Hestiaeans O
dwelling O
at O
Hestiaea O
in O
Euboea. O
Of O
the O
rest O
some O
joined O
in O
the O
expedition O
as O
subjects O
of O
the O
Athenians O
others O
as O
independent O
allies O
others O
as O
mercenaries. O
To O
the O
number O
of O
the O
subjects O
paying O
tribute O
belonged O
the O
Eretrians O
Chalcidians O
Styrians O
and O
Carystians O
from O
Euboea; O
the O
Ceans O
Andrians O
and O
Tenians O
from O
the O
islands; O
and O
the O
Milesians O
Samians O
and O
Chians O
from O
Ionia. O
The O
Chians O
however O
joined O
as O
independent O
allies O
paying O
no O
tribute O
but O
furnishing O
ships. O
Most O
of O
these O
were O
Ionians O
and O
descended B-LOC
from O
the O
Athenians O
except O
the B-LOC
Carystians O
who O
are O
Dryopes O
and O
although O
subjects O
and O
obliged O
to O
serve O
were O
still O
Ionians O
fighting O
against O
Dorians. O
Besides O
these O
there O
were O
men O
of O
Aeolic O
race O
the O
Methymnians O
subjects O
who O
provided O
ships O
not O
tribute O
and O
the O
Tenedians O
and B-LOC
Aenians I-LOC
who O
paid O
tribute. O
These O
Aeolians O
fought O
against O
their O
Aeolian O
founders O
the O
Boeotians O
in O
the O
Syracusan O
army O
because O
they O
were O
obliged O
while O
the O
Plataeans O
the O
only O
native O
Boeotians O
opposed O
to O
Boeotians O
did O
so O
upon O
a O
just O
quarrel. O
Of O
the O
Rhodians O
and O
Cytherians O
both O
Dorians O
the O
latter O
Lacedaemonian O
colonists O
fought O
in O
the O
Athenian O
ranks O
against O
their O
Lacedaemonian O
countrymen O
with O
Gylippus; O
while O
the O
Rhodians O
Argives O
by O
race O
were O
compelled O
to O
bear O
arms O
against O
the O
Dorian O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
own O
colonists O
the O
Geloans O
serving O
with O
the O
Syracusans. O
Of O
the O
islanders O
round O
Peloponnese O
the O
Cephallenians O
and O
Zacynthians O
accompanied O
the O
Athenians O
as O
independent O
allies O
although O
their O
insular O
position O
really O
left O
them O
little O
choice O
in O
the O
matter O
owing O
to O
the O
maritime O
supremacy O
of O
Athens O
while O
the O
Corcyraeans O
who O
were O
not O
only O
Dorians O
but O
Corinthians O
were O
openly O
serving O
against O
Corinthians O
and O
Syracusans O
although O
colonists O
of O
the O
former O
and O
of O
the O
same O
race O
as O
the O
latter O
under O
colour O
of O
compulsion O
but O
really O
out O
of O
free O
will O
through O
hatred O
of O
Corinth. O
The O
Messenians O
as O
they O
are O
now O
called O
in O
Naupactus O
and O
from O
Pylos O
then O
held O
by O
the O
Athenians O
were O
taken O
with O
them O
to O
the O
war. O
There O
were O
also O
a O
few O
Megarian O
exiles O
whose O
fate O
it O
was O
to O
be O
now O
fighting O
against O
the O
Megarian O
Selinuntines. O
The O
engagement O
of O
the O
rest O
was O
more O
of O
a O
voluntary O
nature. O
It O
was O
less O
the O
league O
than O
hatred O
of O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
and O
the O
immediate O
private O
advantage O
of O
each O
individual O
that O
persuaded O
the O
Dorian O
Argives O
to O
join O
the O
Ionian O
Athenians O
in O
a O
war O
against O
Dorians; O
while O
the O
Mantineans O
and O
other O
Arcadian O
mercenaries O
accustomed O
to O
go O
against O
the O
enemy O
pointed O
out O
to O
them O
at O
the O
moment O
were O
led O
by O
interest O
to O
regard O
the O
Arcadians O
serving O
with O
the O
Corinthians O
as O
just O
as O
much O
their O
enemies O
as O
any O
others. O
The O
Cretans O
and O
Aetolians O
also O
served O
for O
hire O
and O
the O
Cretans O
who O
had O
joined O
the O
Rhodians O
in O
founding O
Gela O
thus O
came O
to O
consent O
to O
fight O
for O
pay O
against O
instead O
of O
for O
their O
colonists. O
There O
were O
also O
some O
Acarnanians O
paid O
to O
serve O
although O
they O
came O
chiefly O
for O
love O
of O
Demosthenes O
and O
out O
of O
goodwill O
to O
the O
Athenians O
whose O
allies O
they O
were. O
These O
all O
lived O
on O
the O
Hellenic O
side O
of O
the O
Ionian O
Gulf. O
Of O
the O
Italiots O
there O
were O
the O
Thurians O
and O
Metapontines O
dragged O
into O
the O
quarrel O
by O
the O
stern O
necessities O
of O
a O
time O
of O
revolution; O
of O
the O
Siceliots O
the O
Naxians O
and O
the O
Catanians; O
and O
of O
the O
barbarians O
the O
Egestaeans O
who O
called O
in O
the O
Athenians O
most O
of O
the O
Sicels O
and O
outside O
Sicily O
some O
Tyrrhenian O
enemies O
of O
Syracuse O
and O
Iapygian O
mercenaries. O
Such O
were O
the O
peoples O
serving O
with O
the O
Athenians. O
58Against O
these O
the O
Syracusans O
had O
the O
Camarinaeans O
their O
neighbours O
the O
Geloans O
who O
live O
next O
to O
them; O
then O
passing O
over O
the O
neutral O
Agrigentines O
the O
Selinuntines O
settled O
on O
the O
farther O
side O
of O
the O
island. O
These O
inhabit O
the O
part O
of O
Sicily O
looking O
towards O
Libya; O
the O
Himeraeans O
came O
from O
the O
side O
towards O
the O
Tyrrhenian O
Sea O
being O
the O
only O
Hellenic O
inhabitants O
in O
that O
quarter O
and O
the O
only O
people O
that O
came O
from O
thence O
to O
the O
aid O
of O
the O
Syracusans. O
Of O
the O
Hellenes O
in O
Sicily O
the O
above O
peoples O
joined O
in O
the O
war O
all O
Dorians O
and O
independent O
and O
of O
the O
barbarians O
the O
Sicels O
only O
that O
is O
to O
say O
such O
as O
did O
not O
go O
over O
to O
the O
Athenians. O
Of O
the O
Hellenes O
outside O
Sicily O
there O
were O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
who O
provided O
a O
Spartan O
to O
take O
the O
command O
and O
a O
force O
of O
Neodamodes O
or O
Freedmen O
and O
of O
Helots; O
the O
Corinthians O
who O
alone O
joined O
with O
naval O
and O
land O
forces O
with O
their O
Leucadian O
and O
Ambraciot O
kinsmen; O
some O
mercenaries O
sent O
by O
Corinth O
from O
Arcadia; O
some O
Sicyonians O
forced O
to O
serve O
and B-LOC
from O
outside O
Peloponnese O
the O
Boeotians. B-LOC
In O
comparison O
however O
with O
these O
foreign O
auxiliaries O
the O
great O
Siceliot O
cities O
furnished O
more O
in O
every O
department O
numbers O
of O
heavy O
infantry O
ships O
and O
horses O
and O
an O
immense O
multitude O
besides O
having O
been O
brought O
together; O
while O
in O
comparison O
again O
one O
may O
say O
with O
all O
the O
rest O
put O
together O
more O
was O
provided O
by B-LOC
the I-LOC
Syracusans O
themselves O
both O
from B-PER
the I-PER
greatness I-PER
of O
the O
city O
and O
from O
the O
fact O
that O
they O
were O
in O
the O
greatest O
danger. O
59Such O
were O
the O
auxiliaries O
brought O
together O
on O
either O
side O
all O
of O
which O
had O
by O
this O
time O
joined O
neither O
party O
experiencing O
any O
subsequent O
accession. O
It O
was O
no O
wonder O
therefore O
if O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
thought O
that O
it O
would O
win O
them O
great O
glory O
if O
they O
could O
follow O
up O
their O
recent O
victory O
in O
the O
sea O
fight B-LOC
by O
the O
capture O
of O
the O
whole O
Athenian O
armada O
without O
letting O
it O
escape O
either O
by O
sea O
or O
by O
land. O
They O
began O
at O
once O
to O
close O
up O
the O
Great O
Harbour O
by O
means O
of O
boats O
merchant O
vessels O
and O
galleys O
moored O
broadside O
across O
its O
mouth O
which O
is O
nearly O
a O
mile O
wide O
and O
made O
all O
their O
other O
arrangements O
for O
the O
event O
of O
the O
Athenians O
again O
venturing O
to O
fight O
at O
sea. O
There O
was O
in O
fact O
nothing O
little O
either O
in O
their O
plans O
or O
their O
ideas. O
60The O
Athenians O
seeing O
them O
closing O
up O
the O
harbour O
and O
informed O
of O
their O
further O
designs O
called O
a O
council O
of O
war. O
The O
generals O
and O
colonels O
assembled O
and O
discussed O
the O
difficulties O
of O
the O
situation; O
the O
point O
which O
pressed O
most O
being O
that O
they O
no O
longer O
had O
provisions O
for O
immediate O
use O
(having O
sent O
on O
to O
Catana O
to O
tell O
them O
not O
to O
send O
any O
in O
the O
belief O
that O
they O
were O
going O
away) O
and O
that O
they O
would O
not O
have O
any O
in O
future O
unless O
they O
could O
command O
the O
sea. O
They O
therefore O
determined O
to O
evacuate O
their O
upper O
lines O
to O
enclose O
with O
a O
cross O
wall O
and O
garrison O
a O
small O
space O
close O
to O
the O
ships O
only O
just O
sufficient O
to O
hold O
their O
stores O
and O
sick O
and O
manning O
all O
the O
ships O
seaworthy O
or O
not O
with O
every O
man O
that O
could O
be O
spared O
from O
the O
rest O
of O
their O
land O
forces O
to O
fight O
it O
out O
at O
sea O
and O
if O
victorious O
to O
go O
to O
Catana O
if O
not O
to O
burn O
their O
vessels O
form O
in O
close O
order O
and O
retreat O
by O
land O
for O
the O
nearest O
friendly O
place O
they O
could O
reach O
Hellenic O
or O
barbarian. O
This O
was O
no O
sooner O
settled O
than O
carried O
into O
effect; O
they O
descended O
gradually O
from O
the O
upper O
lines O
and O
manned O
all O
their O
vessels O
compelling O
all O
to O
go O
on O
board O
who O
were O
of O
age O
to O
be O
in O
any O
way O
of O
use. O
They O
thus O
succeeded O
in O
manning O
about O
one O
hundred O
and O
ten O
ships O
in O
all O
on O
board O
of O
which O
they O
embarked O
a O
number O
of O
archers O
and O
darters O
taken O
from O
the O
Acarnanians O
and O
from O
the O
other O
foreigners O
making O
all O
other O
provisions O
allowed O
by O
the O
nature O
of O
their O
plan O
and O
by O
the O
necessities O
which O
imposed O
it. O
All O
was O
now O
nearly O
ready O
and O
Nicias O
seeing O
the O
soldiery O
disheartened O
by O
their O
unprecedented O
and O
decided O
defeat O
at O
sea O
and O
by O
reason O
of O
the O
scarcity O
of O
provisions O
eager O
to O
fight O
it O
out O
as O
soon O
as O
possible O
called O
them O
all O
together O
and O
first O
addressed O
them O
speaking O
as O
follows O
61"Soldiers O
of O
the O
Athenians O
and O
of O
the O
allies O
we O
have O
all O
an O
equal O
interest O
in O
the O
coming O
struggle O
in O
which O
life O
and O
country O
are O
at O
stake O
for O
us O
quite O
as O
much O
as O
they O
can O
be O
for O
the O
enemy; O
since O
if O
our O
fleet O
wins O
the O
day O
each O
can O
see O
his O
native O
city O
again O
wherever O
that O
city O
may O
be. O
You O
must O
not O
lose O
heart O
or O
be O
like O
men O
without O
any O
experience O
who O
fail O
in O
a O
first O
essay O
and O
ever O
afterwards O
fearfully O
forebode O
a O
future O
as O
disastrous. O
But O
let O
the O
Athenians O
among O
you O
who O
have O
already O
had O
experience O
of O
many O
wars O
and O
the O
allies O
who O
have O
joined O
us O
in O
so O
many O
expeditions O
remember O
the O
surprises O
of O
war O
and O
with O
the O
hope O
that O
fortune O
will O
not O
be O
always O
against O
us O
prepare O
to O
fight O
again O
in O
a O
manner O
worthy O
of O
the O
number O
which O
you O
see O
yourselves O
to O
be. O
62"Now O
whatever O
we O
thought O
would O
be O
of O
service O
against O
the O
crush O
of O
vessels O
in O
such O
a O
narrow O
harbour O
and O
against O
the O
force O
upon O
the O
decks O
of O
the O
enemy O
from O
which O
we O
suffered O
before O
has O
all O
been O
considered O
with O
the O
helmsmen O
and O
as O
far O
as O
our O
means O
allowed O
provided. O
A O
number O
of O
archers O
and O
darters O
will O
go O
on O
board O
and O
a O
multitude O
that O
we O
should O
not O
have O
employed O
in O
an O
action O
in O
the O
open O
sea O
where O
our O
science O
would O
be O
crippled O
by O
the O
weight O
of O
the O
vessels; O
but O
in O
the O
present O
land O
fight O
that O
we O
are O
forced O
to O
make O
from O
shipboard O
all O
this O
will O
be O
useful. O
We O
have O
also O
discovered O
the O
changes O
in O
construction O
that O
we O
must O
make O
to O
meet O
theirs; O
and O
against O
the O
thickness O
of O
their O
cheeks O
which O
did O
us O
the O
greatest O
mischief O
we O
have O
provided O
grappling O
irons O
which O
will O
prevent O
an O
assailant O
backing O
water O
after O
charging O
if O
the O
soldiers O
on O
deck O
here O
do O
their O
duty; O
since O
we O
are O
absolutely O
compelled O
to O
fight O
a O
land O
battle O
from O
the O
fleet O
and O
it O
seems O
to O
be O
our O
interest O
neither O
to O
back O
water O
ourselves O
nor O
to O
let O
the O
enemy O
do O
so O
especially O
as O
the O
shore O
except O
so O
much O
of O
it O
as O
may O
be O
held O
by O
our O
troops O
is O
hostile O
ground. O
63"You O
must O
remember O
this O
and O
fight O
on O
as O
long O
as O
you O
can O
and O
must O
not O
let O
yourselves O
be O
driven O
ashore O
but O
once O
alongside O
must O
make O
up O
your O
minds O
not O
to O
part O
company O
until O
you O
have O
swept O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
from O
the O
enemy's O
deck. O
I O
say O
this O
more O
for O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
than O
for O
the O
seamen O
as O
it O
is O
more O
the O
business O
of O
the O
men O
on O
deck; O
and O
our O
land O
forces O
are O
even O
now O
on O
the O
whole O
the O
strongest. O
The O
sailors O
I O
advise O
and O
at O
the O
same O
time O
implore O
not O
to O
be O
too O
much O
daunted O
by O
their O
misfortunes O
now O
that O
we O
have O
our O
decks O
better O
armed O
and O
greater O
number O
of O
vessels. O
Bear O
in O
mind O
how O
well O
worth O
preserving O
is O
the O
pleasure O
felt O
by O
those O
of O
you O
who O
through O
your O
knowledge O
of O
our O
language O
and O
imitation O
of O
our O
manners O
were O
always O
considered O
Athenians O
even O
though O
not O
so O
in O
reality O
and O
as O
such O
were O
honoured O
throughout O
Hellas O
and O
had O
your O
full O
share O
of O
the O
advantages O
of O
our O
empire O
and O
more O
than O
your O
share O
in O
the O
respect O
of O
our O
subjects O
and O
in O
protection O
from O
ill O
treatment. O
You O
therefore O
with O
whom O
alone O
we O
freely O
share O
our O
empire O
we O
now O
justly O
require O
not O
to O
betray O
that O
empire O
in O
its O
extremity O
and O
in O
scorn O
of O
Corinthians O
whom O
you O
have O
often O
conquered O
and O
of O
Siceliots O
none O
of O
whom O
so O
much O
as O
presumed O
to O
stand O
against O
us O
when O
our O
navy O
was O
in O
its O
prime O
we O
ask O
you O
to O
repel O
them O
and O
to O
show O
that O
even O
in O
sickness O
and O
disaster O
your O
skill O
is O
more O
than O
a O
match O
for O
the O
fortune O
and O
vigour O
of O
any O
other. O
64"For O
the O
Athenians O
among O
you O
I O
add O
once O
more O
this O
reflection O
You O
left O
behind O
you O
no O
more O
such O
ships O
in O
your O
docks O
as O
these O
no O
more O
heavy O
infantry O
in O
their O
flower; O
if O
you O
do O
aught O
but O
conquer O
our O
enemies O
here O
will O
immediately O
sail O
thither O
and O
those O
that O
are O
left O
of O
us O
at O
Athens O
will O
become O
unable O
to O
repel O
their O
home O
assailants O
reinforced O
by O
these O
new O
allies. O
Here O
you O
will O
fall O
at O
once O
into O
the O
hands O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
I O
need O
not O
remind O
you O
of O
the O
intentions O
with O
which O
you O
attacked O
them O
and O
your O
countrymen O
at O
home O
will O
fall O
into O
those O
of O
the O
Lacedaemonians. O
Since O
the O
fate O
of O
both O
thus O
hangs O
upon O
this O
single O
battle O
now O
if O
ever O
stand O
firm O
and O
remember O
each O
and O
all O
that O
you O
who O
are O
now O
going O
on O
board O
are O
the O
army O
and O
navy O
of O
the O
Athenians O
and O
all O
that O
is O
left O
of O
the O
state O
and O
the O
great O
name O
of O
Athens O
in O
whose O
defence O
if O
any O
man O
has O
any O
advantage O
in O
skill O
or O
courage O
now O
is O
the O
time O
for O
him O
to O
show O
it O
and O
thus O
serve O
himself O
and O
save O
all." O
65After O
this O
address O
Nicias O
at O
once O
gave O
orders O
to O
man O
the O
ships. O
Meanwhile O
Gylippus O
and O
the O
Syracusans O
could O
perceive O
by O
the O
preparations O
which O
they O
saw O
going O
on O
that O
the O
Athenians O
meant O
to O
fight O
at O
sea. O
They O
had O
also O
notice O
of O
the O
grappling O
irons O
against O
which O
they O
specially O
provided O
by O
stretching O
hides O
over O
the O
prows O
and O
much O
of O
the O
upper O
part O
of O
their O
vessels O
in O
order O
that O
the O
irons O
when O
thrown O
might O
slip O
off O
without O
taking O
hold. O
All O
being O
now O
ready O
the O
generals O
and O
Gylippus O
addressed O
them O
in O
the O
following O
terms O
66"Syracusans O
and O
allies O
the O
glorious O
character O
of O
our O
past O
achievements O
and O
the O
no O
less O
glorious O
results O
at O
issue O
in O
the O
coming O
battle O
are O
we O
think O
understood O
by O
most O
of O
you O
or O
you O
would O
never O
have O
thrown O
yourselves O
with O
such O
ardour O
into O
the O
struggle; O
and O
if O
there O
be O
any O
one O
not O
as O
fully O
aware O
of O
the O
facts O
as O
he O
ought O
to O
be O
we O
will O
declare O
them O
to O
him. O
The O
Athenians O
came O
to O
this O
country O
first O
to O
effect O
the O
conquest O
of O
Sicily O
and O
after O
that O
if O
successful O
of O
Peloponnese O
and O
the O
rest O
of O
Hellas O
possessing O
already O
the O
greatest O
empire O
yet O
known O
of O
present O
or O
former O
times O
among O
the O
Hellenes. O
Here O
for O
the O
first O
time O
they O
found O
in O
you O
men O
who O
faced O
their O
navy O
which O
made O
them O
masters O
everywhere; O
you O
have O
already O
defeated O
them B-PER
in O
the O
previous O
sea O
fights O
and O
will O
in O
all O
likelihood O
defeat O
them O
again O
now. O
When O
men O
are O
once O
checked O
in O
what O
they O
consider O
their O
special O
excellence O
their O
whole O
opinion O
of O
themselves O
suffers O
more O
than O
if O
they O
had O
not O
at O
first O
believed O
in O
their O
superiority O
the O
unexpected O
shock O
to O
their O
pride O
causing O
them O
to O
give O
way O
more O
than O
their O
real O
strength O
warrants; O
and O
this O
is O
probably O
now O
the O
case O
with O
the O
Athenians. O
67"With O
us O
it O
is O
different. O
The O
original O
estimate O
of O
ourselves O
which O
gave O
us O
courage O
in O
the O
days O
of O
our O
unskilfulness O
has O
been O
strengthened O
while O
the O
conviction O
superadded O
to O
it O
that O
we O
must O
be O
the O
best O
seamen O
of O
the O
time O
if O
we O
have O
conquered O
the O
best O
has O
given O
a O
double O
measure O
of O
hope O
to O
every O
man O
among O
us; O
and O
for O
the O
most O
part O
where O
there O
is O
the O
greatest O
hope O
there O
is O
also O
the O
greatest O
ardour O
for O
action. O
The O
means O
to O
combat O
us O
which O
they O
have O
tried O
to O
find O
in O
copying O
our O
armament O
are O
familiar O
to O
our O
warfare O
and O
will O
be O
met O
by O
proper O
provisions; O
while O
they O
will O
never O
be O
able O
to O
have O
a O
number O
of O
heavy O
infantry O
on O
their O
decks O
contrary O
to O
their O
custom O
and O
a O
number O
of O
darters O
(born O
landsmen O
one O
may O
say O
Acarnanians O
and O
others O
embarked O
afloat O
who O
will O
not O
know O
how O
to O
discharge O
their O
weapons O
when O
they O
have O
to O
keep O
still) O
without O
hampering O
their O
vessels O
and O
falling O
all O
into O
confusion O
among O
themselves O
through O
fighting O
not O
according O
to O
their O
own O
tactics. O
For O
they O
will O
gain O
nothing O
by O
the O
number O
of O
their O
ships O
I O
say O
this O
to O
those O
of O
you O
who O
may O
be O
alarmed O
by O
having O
to O
fight O
against O
odds O
as O
a O
quantity O
of O
ships O
in O
a O
confined O
space O
will O
only O
be O
slower O
in O
executing O
the O
movements O
required O
and O
most O
exposed O
to O
injury O
from O
our O
means O
of O
offence. O
Indeed O
if O
you O
would O
know O
the O
plain O
truth O
as O
we O
are O
credibly O
informed O
the O
excess O
of O
their O
sufferings O
and O
the O
necessities O
of O
their O
present O
distress O
have O
made O
them O
desperate; O
they O
have O
no O
confidence O
in O
their O
force O
but O
wish O
to O
try O
their O
fortune O
in O
the O
only O
way O
they O
can O
and O
either O
to O
force O
their O
passage O
and O
sail O
out O
or O
after O
this O
to O
retreat O
by O
land O
it O
being O
impossible O
for O
them O
to O
be O
worse O
off O
than O
they O
are. O
68"The O
fortune O
of O
our O
greatest O
enemies O
having O
thus O
betrayed O
itself O
and O
their O
disorder O
being O
what O
I O
have O
described O
let O
us O
engage O
in O
anger O
convinced O
that O
as O
between O
adversaries O
nothing O
is O
more O
legitimate O
than O
to O
claim O
to O
sate O
the O
whole O
wrath O
of O
one's O
soul O
in O
punishing O
the O
aggressor O
and O
nothing O
more O
sweet O
as O
the O
proverb O
has O
it O
than O
the O
vengeance O
upon O
an O
enemy O
which O
it O
will O
now O
be O
ours O
to O
take. O
That O
enemies O
they O
are O
and O
mortal O
enemies O
you O
all O
know O
since O
they O
came O
here O
to O
enslave O
our O
country O
and O
if O
successful O
had O
in O
reserve O
for O
our O
men O
all O
that O
is O
most O
dreadful O
and O
for O
our O
children O
and O
wives O
all O
that O
is O
most O
dishonourable O
and O
for O
the O
whole O
city O
the O
name O
which O
conveys O
the O
greatest O
reproach. O
None O
should O
therefore O
relent O
or O
think O
it O
gain O
if O
they O
go O
away O
without O
further O
danger O
to O
us. O
This O
they O
will O
do O
just O
the O
same O
even O
if O
they O
get O
the O
victory; O
while O
if O
we O
succeed O
as O
we O
may O
expect O
in O
chastising O
them O
and O
in O
handing O
down O
to O
all O
Sicily O
her O
ancient O
freedom O
strengthened O
and O
confirmed O
we O
shall O
have O
achieved O
no O
mean O
triumph. O
And O
the O
rarest O
dangers O
are O
those O
in O
which O
failure O
brings O
little O
loss O
and O
success O
the O
greatest O
advantage." O
69After O
the O
above O
address O
to O
the O
soldiers O
on O
their O
side O
the O
Syracusan O
generals O
and O
Gylippus O
now O
perceived O
that O
the O
Athenians O
were O
manning O
their O
ships O
and O
immediately O
proceeded O
to O
man O
their O
own O
also. O
Meanwhile O
Nicias O
appalled O
by O
the O
position O
of O
affairs O
realizing O
the O
greatness O
and O
the O
nearness O
of O
the O
danger O
now O
that O
they O
were O
on O
the O
point O
of O
putting O
out O
from O
shore O
and O
thinking O
as O
men O
are O
apt O
to O
think O
in O
great O
crises O
that O
when O
all O
has O
been O
done O
they O
have O
still O
something O
left O
to O
do O
and O
when O
all O
has O
been O
said O
that O
they O
have O
not O
yet O
said O
enough O
again O
called O
on O
the O
captains O
one O
by O
one O
addressing O
each O
by O
his O
father's O
name O
and O
by O
his O
own O
and O
by O
that O
of O
his O
tribe O
and O
adjured O
them O
not O
to O
belie O
their O
own O
personal O
renown O
or O
to O
obscure O
the O
hereditary O
virtues O
for O
which O
their O
ancestors O
were O
illustrious O
he O
reminded O
them O
of O
their O
country O
the O
freest O
of O
the O
free O
and O
of O
the O
unfettered O
discretion O
allowed O
in O
it O
to O
all O
to O
live O
as O
they O
pleased; O
and O
added O
other O
arguments O
such O
as O
men O
would O
use O
at O
such O
a O
crisis O
and O
which O
with O
little O
alteration O
are O
made O
to O
serve O
on O
all O
occasions O
alike O
appeals O
to B-LOC
wives O
children O
and O
national O
gods O
without O
caring O
whether O
they O
are O
thought O
commonplace O
but O
loudly O
invoking O
them O
in O
the O
belief O
that O
they O
will O
be O
of O
use O
in O
the O
consternation O
of O
the O
moment. O
Having O
thus O
admonished O
them O
not O
he O
felt O
as O
he O
would O
but O
as O
he O
could O
Nicias O
withdrew O
and O
led O
the O
troops O
to O
the O
sea O
and O
ranged O
them O
in O
as O
long O
a O
line O
as O
he O
was O
able O
in O
order O
to O
aid O
as O
far O
as O
possible O
in O
sustaining O
the O
courage O
of O
the O
men O
afloat; O
while O
Demosthenes O
Menander O
and O
Euthydemus O
who O
took O
the O
command O
on O
board O
put O
out O
from O
their O
own O
camp O
and O
sailed O
straight O
to O
the O
barrier O
across O
the O
mouth O
of O
the O
harbour O
and O
to O
the O
passage O
left O
open O
to O
try O
to O
force O
their O
way O
out. O
70The O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
had O
already O
put O
out O
with O
about O
the O
same O
number O
of O
ships O
as O
before O
a O
part O
of O
which O
kept O
guard O
at O
the O
outlet O
and O
the O
remainder O
all O
round O
the O
rest O
of O
the O
harbour O
in O
order O
to O
attack O
the O
Athenians O
on O
all O
sides O
at O
once; O
while O
the O
land O
forces O
held O
themselves O
in O
readiness O
at O
the O
points O
at O
which O
the O
vessels O
might O
put O
into O
the O
shore. O
The O
Syracusan O
fleet O
was O
commanded O
by O
Sicanus O
and O
Agatharchus O
who O
had O
each O
a O
wing O
of O
the O
whole O
force O
with O
Pythen O
and O
the O
Corinthians O
in O
the O
centre. O
When O
the O
rest O
of O
the O
Athenians O
came O
up O
to O
the O
barrier O
with O
the O
first O
shock O
of O
their O
charge O
they O
overpowered O
the O
ships O
stationed O
there O
and O
tried O
to O
undo O
the O
fastenings; O
after O
this O
as O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
allies O
bore O
down O
upon O
them O
from O
all O
quarters O
the O
action O
spread O
from O
the O
barrier O
over O
the O
whole O
harbour O
and O
was O
more O
obstinately O
disputed O
than O
any O
of O
the O
preceding O
ones. O
On O
either O
side O
the O
rowers O
showed O
great B-PER
zeal O
in O
bringing O
up O
their O
vessels O
at O
the O
boatswains' O
orders O
and O
the O
helmsmen O
great O
skill O
in O
manoeuvring O
and O
great O
emulation O
one O
with O
another; O
while O
the O
ships O
once O
alongside O
the O
soldiers O
on O
board O
did O
their O
best O
not O
to O
let O
the O
service O
on O
deck O
be O
outdone O
by O
the O
others; O
in O
short O
every O
man O
strove O
to O
prove O
himself O
the O
first O
in O
his O
particular O
department. O
And O
as O
many O
ships O
were O
engaged O
in O
a O
small O
compass O
(for O
these O
were O
the O
largest O
fleets O
fighting O
in O
the O
narrowest O
space O
ever O
known O
being O
together O
little O
short O
of O
two O
hundred) O
the O
regular O
attacks O
with O
the O
beak O
were O
few O
there O
being O
no O
opportunity O
of O
backing O
water O
or O
of O
breaking O
the O
line; O
while O
the O
collisions O
caused O
by O
one O
ship O
chancing O
to O
run O
foul O
of O
another O
either O
in O
flying O
from O
or O
attacking O
a O
third O
were O
more O
frequent. O
So O
long O
as O
a O
vessel O
was O
coming O
up O
to O
the O
charge O
the O
men O
on O
the O
decks O
rained O
darts O
and O
arrows O
and O
stones O
upon B-PER
her; O
but O
once O
alongside O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
tried O
to O
board O
each O
other's O
vessel O
fighting O
hand O
to O
hand. O
In O
many O
quarters O
it O
happened O
by O
reason O
of O
the O
narrow O
room O
that O
a O
vessel O
was O
charging O
an O
enemy O
on O
one O
side O
and O
being O
charged O
herself O
on O
another O
and O
that O
two O
or O
sometimes O
more O
ships O
had O
perforce O
got O
entangled O
round O
one O
obliging O
the O
helmsmen O
to O
attend O
to O
defence O
here O
offence O
there O
not O
to O
one O
thing O
at O
once O
but O
to O
many O
on O
all O
sides; O
while O
the O
huge O
din O
caused O
by O
the O
number O
of O
ships O
crashing O
together O
not O
only O
spread O
terror O
but O
made O
the O
orders O
of O
the O
boatswains O
inaudible. O
The O
boatswains O
on O
either O
side O
in O
the O
discharge O
of O
their O
duty O
and O
in O
the O
heat O
of O
the O
conflict O
shouted O
incessantly O
orders O
and O
appeals O
to O
their O
men; O
the O
Athenians O
they O
urged O
to O
force O
the O
passage O
out O
and O
now O
if O
ever O
to O
show O
their O
mettle O
and O
lay O
hold O
of O
a O
safe O
return O
to O
their O
country; O
to O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
they O
cried O
that O
it O
would O
be O
glorious O
to O
prevent O
the O
escape O
of O
the O
enemy O
and O
conquering O
to O
exalt O
the O
countries O
that O
were O
theirs. O
The O
generals O
moreover O
on O
either O
side O
if O
they O
saw O
any O
in O
any O
part O
of O
the O
battle O
backing O
ashore O
without O
being O
forced O
to O
do O
so O
called O
out O
to O
the O
captain O
by O
name O
and O
asked O
him O
the O
Athenians O
whether O
they O
were O
retreating O
because O
they O
thought O
the O
thrice O
hostile O
shore O
more O
their O
own O
than O
that O
sea O
which O
had O
cost O
them O
so O
much O
labour O
to O
win; O
the O
Syracusans O
whether O
they O
were O
flying O
from O
the O
flying O
Athenians O
whom O
they O
well O
knew O
to O
be O
eager O
to O
escape O
in O
whatever O
way O
they O
could. O
71Meanwhile O
the O
two O
armies O
on O
shore O
while O
victory O
hung O
in O
the O
balance O
were O
a O
prey O
to O
the O
most O
agonizing O
and O
conflicting O
emotions; O
the O
natives O
thirsting O
for O
more O
glory O
than O
they O
had O
already O
won O
while O
the O
invaders O
feared O
to O
find O
themselves O
in O
even O
worse O
plight O
than O
before. O
The O
all O
of O
the O
Athenians O
being O
set O
upon O
their O
fleet O
their O
fear O
for O
the O
event O
was O
like O
nothing O
they O
had O
ever O
felt; O
while O
their O
view O
of O
the O
struggle O
was O
necessarily O
as O
chequered O
as O
the O
battle O
itself. O
Close O
to O
the O
scene O
of O
action O
and O
not O
all O
looking O
at O
the O
same O
point O
at O
once O
some O
saw O
their O
friends O
victorious O
and O
took O
courage O
and O
fell O
to O
calling O
upon O
heaven O
not O
to O
deprive O
them O
of O
salvation O
while O
others O
who O
had O
their O
eyes O
turned O
upon O
the O
losers O
wailed O
and O
cried O
aloud O
and O
although O
spectators O
were O
more O
overcome O
than O
the O
actual O
combatants. O
Others O
again O
were O
gazing O
at O
some O
spot O
where O
the O
battle O
was O
evenly O
disputed; O
as O
the O
strife O
was O
protracted O
without O
decision O
their O
swaying O
bodies O
reflected O
the O
agitation O
of O
their O
minds O
and O
they O
suffered O
the O
worst O
agony O
of O
all O
ever O
just O
within O
reach O
of O
safety O
or O
just O
on O
the O
point O
of O
destruction. O
In O
short O
in O
that O
one O
Athenian O
army O
as O
long O
as O
the O
sea O
fight O
remained O
doubtful O
there O
was O
every O
sound O
to O
be O
heard O
at O
once O
shrieks O
cheers O
"We O
win O
" O
"We O
lose O
" O
and O
all O
the O
other O
manifold O
exclamations O
that O
a O
great O
host O
would O
necessarily O
utter O
in O
great O
peril; O
and O
with O
the O
men O
in O
the O
fleet O
it O
was O
nearly O
the O
same; O
until O
at O
last O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
after O
the O
battle O
had O
lasted O
a O
long O
while O
put O
the O
Athenians O
to O
flight O
and O
with O
much O
shouting O
and O
cheering O
chased O
them O
in O
open O
rout O
to O
the O
shore. O
The O
naval O
force O
one O
one O
way O
one O
another O
as O
many O
as O
were O
not O
taken O
afloat O
now O
ran O
ashore O
and O
rushed O
from O
on O
board O
their O
ships O
to O
their O
camp; O
while O
the O
army O
no O
more O
divided O
but O
carried O
away O
by O
one O
impulse O
all O
with O
shrieks O
and O
groans O
deplored O
the O
event O
and O
ran O
down O
some O
to O
help O
the O
ships O
others O
to O
guard O
what O
was O
left O
of O
their O
wall O
while O
the O
remaining O
and O
most O
numerous O
part O
already O
began O
to O
consider O
how O
they O
should O
save O
themselves. O
Indeed O
the O
panic O
of O
the O
present O
moment O
had O
never O
been O
surpassed. O
They O
now O
suffered O
very O
nearly O
what O
they O
had O
inflicted O
at O
Pylos; O
as O
then O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
with O
the O
loss O
of O
their O
fleet O
lost O
also O
the O
men O
who O
had O
crossed O
over O
to O
the O
island O
so O
now O
the O
Athenians O
had O
no O
hope O
of O
escaping O
by O
land O
without O
the O
help O
of O
some O
extraordinary O
accident. O
72The O
sea O
fight O
having O
been O
a O
severe O
one O
and O
many O
ships O
and O
lives O
having O
been O
lost O
on O
both O
sides O
the O
victorious O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
now O
picked O
up O
their O
wrecks O
and O
dead O
and O
sailed O
off O
to O
the O
city O
and O
set O
up O
a O
trophy. O
The O
Athenians O
overwhelmed O
by O
their O
misfortune O
never O
even O
thought O
of O
asking O
leave O
to O
take O
up O
their O
dead O
or O
wrecks O
but O
wished O
to O
retreat O
that O
very O
night. O
Demosthenes O
however O
went O
to O
Nicias O
and O
gave O
it O
as O
his O
opinion O
that O
they O
should O
man O
the O
ships O
they O
had O
left O
and O
make O
another O
effort O
to O
force O
their O
passage O
out O
next O
morning; O
saying O
that O
they O
had O
still O
left O
more O
ships O
fit O
for O
service O
than O
the O
enemy O
the O
Athenians O
having O
about O
sixty O
remaining O
as O
against O
less O
than O
fifty O
of O
their O
opponents. O
Nicias O
was O
quite O
of O
his O
mind; O
but O
when O
they O
wished O
to O
man O
the O
vessels O
the O
sailors O
refused O
to O
go O
on O
board O
being O
so O
utterly O
overcome O
by O
their O
defeat O
as O
no O
longer O
to O
believe O
in O
the O
possibility O
of O
success. O
73Accordingly O
they O
all O
now O
made O
up O
their O
minds O
to O
retreat O
by O
land. O
Meanwhile O
the O
Syracusan O
Hermocrates O
suspecting O
their O
intention O
and O
impressed O
by O
the O
danger O
of O
allowing O
a O
force O
of O
that O
magnitude O
to O
retire O
by O
land O
establish O
itself O
in O
some O
other O
part O
of O
Sicily O
and O
from O
thence O
renew O
the O
war O
went O
and O
stated O
his O
views O
to O
the O
authorities O
and O
pointed O
out O
to O
them O
that O
they O
ought O
not O
to O
let O
the O
enemy O
get O
away O
by O
night O
but O
that O
all O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
should O
at O
once O
march O
out O
and O
block O
up O
the O
roads O
and O
seize O
and O
guard O
the O
passes. O
The O
authorities O
were O
entirely O
of O
his O
opinion O
and O
thought O
that O
it O
ought O
to O
be O
done O
but O
on O
the O
other O
hand O
felt O
sure O
that O
the O
people O
who O
had O
given O
themselves O
over O
to O
rejoicing O
and O
were O
taking O
their O
ease O
after O
a O
great O
battle O
at O
sea O
would O
not O
be O
easily O
brought O
to O
obey; O
besides O
they O
were O
celebrating O
a O
festival O
having O
on O
that O
day O
a O
sacrifice O
to O
Heracles O
and B-PER
most I-PER
of O
them O
in O
their O
rapture O
at O
the O
victory O
had O
fallen O
to O
drinking O
at O
the O
festival O
and O
would O
probably O
consent O
to O
anything O
sooner O
than O
to O
take O
up O
their O
arms O
and O
march O
out O
at O
that O
moment. O
For O
these O
reasons O
the O
thing O
appeared O
impracticable O
to O
the O
magistrates; O
and O
Hermocrates O
finding O
himself O
unable O
to O
do O
anything O
further O
with O
them O
had O
now O
recourse O
to O
the O
following O
stratagem O
of O
his O
own. O
What O
he O
feared O
was O
that O
the O
Athenians O
might O
quietly O
get O
the O
start O
of O
them O
by O
passing O
the O
most O
difficult O
places O
during O
the O
night; O
and O
he O
therefore O
sent O
as O
soon O
as O
it O
was O
dusk O
some O
friends O
of O
his O
own O
to O
the O
camp O
with O
some O
horsemen O
who O
rode O
up O
within O
earshot O
and O
called O
out O
to O
some O
of O
the O
men O
as O
though O
they O
were O
well O
wishers O
of O
the O
Athenians O
and O
told O
them O
to O
tell O
Nicias O
(who O
had O
in O
fact O
some O
correspondents O
who O
informed O
him O
of O
what O
went O
on O
inside O
the O
town) O
not O
to O
lead O
off O
the O
army O
by O
night O
as O
the O
Syracusans O
were O
guarding O
the O
roads O
but O
to O
make O
his O
preparations O
at O
his O
leisure O
and O
to O
retreat O
by O
day. O
After O
saying O
this O
they O
departed; O
74and O
their O
hearers O
informed O
the O
Athenian O
generals O
who O
put O
off O
going O
for O
that O
night O
on O
the O
strength O
of O
this O
message O
not O
doubting O
its O
sincerity. O
Since O
after O
all O
they O
had O
not O
set O
out O
at O
once O
they O
now O
determined O
to O
stay O
also O
the O
following O
day O
to O
give O
time O
to O
the O
soldiers O
to O
pack O
up O
as O
well O
as O
they O
could O
the O
most O
useful O
articles O
and O
leaving O
everything O
else O
behind O
to O
start O
only O
with O
what O
was O
strictly O
necessary O
for O
their O
personal O
subsistence. O
Meanwhile O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
Gylippus O
marched O
out O
and O
blocked O
up O
the O
roads O
through O
the O
country O
by O
which O
the O
Athenians O
were O
likely O
to O
pass O
and O
kept O
guard O
at O
the O
fords O
of O
the O
streams O
and O
rivers O
posting O
themselves O
so O
as O
to O
receive O
them O
and O
stop O
the O
army O
where O
they O
thought O
best; O
while O
their O
fleet O
sailed O
up O
to O
the O
beach O
and O
towed O
off O
the O
ships O
of O
the O
Athenians. O
Some O
few O
were O
burned O
by O
the O
Athenians O
themselves O
as O
they O
had O
intended; O
the O
rest O
the O
Syracusans O
lashed O
on O
to O
their O
own O
at O
their O
leisure O
as O
they O
had O
been O
thrown O
up O
on O
shore O
without O
any O
one O
trying O
to O
stop O
them O
and O
conveyed O
to O
the O
town. O
75After O
this O
Nicias O
and O
Demosthenes O
now O
thinking O
that O
enough O
had O
been O
done O
in O
the O
way O
of O
preparation O
the O
removal O
of O
the O
army B-PER
took I-PER
place O
upon O
the O
second O
day O
after O
the O
sea O
fight. O
It O
was O
a O
lamentable O
scene O
not O
merely O
from O
the O
single O
circumstance O
that O
they O
were O
retreating O
after O
having O
lost O
all O
their O
ships O
their O
great O
hopes O
gone O
and O
themselves O
and O
the O
state O
in O
peril; O
but O
also O
in O
leaving O
the O
camp O
there O
were O
things O
most O
grievous O
for O
every O
eye O
and O
heart O
to O
contemplate. O
The O
dead O
lay O
unburied O
and O
each O
man O
as O
he O
recognized O
a O
friend O
among O
them O
shuddered O
with O
grief O
and O
horror; O
while O
the O
living O
whom O
they O
were O
leaving O
behind O
wounded O
or O
sick O
were O
to O
the O
living O
far O
more O
shocking O
than O
the O
dead O
and O
more O
to O
be O
pitied O
than O
those O
who O
had O
perished. O
These O
fell O
to O
entreating O
and O
bewailing O
until O
their O
friends O
knew O
not O
what O
to O
do O
begging O
them O
to O
take O
them O
and O
loudly O
calling O
to O
each O
individual O
comrade O
or O
relative O
whom O
they O
could O
see O
hanging O
upon O
the O
necks O
of O
their O
tent O
fellows O
in O
the O
act O
of O
departure O
and O
following O
as O
far O
as O
they O
could O
and O
when O
their O
bodily O
strength O
failed O
them O
calling O
again O
and O
again O
upon O
heaven O
and O
shrieking O
aloud O
as O
they O
were O
left O
behind. O
So O
that O
the O
whole O
army O
being O
filled O
with O
tears O
and O
distracted O
after O
this O
fashion O
found O
it O
not O
easy O
to O
go O
even O
from O
an O
enemy's O
land O
where O
they O
had O
already O
suffered O
evils O
too O
great O
for O
tears O
and O
in O
the O
unknown O
future O
before O
them O
feared O
to O
suffer O
more. O
Dejection O
and O
self O
condemnation O
were O
also O
rife O
among O
them. B-PER
Indeed O
they O
could O
only O
be O
compared O
to O
a O
starved O
out O
town O
and O
that O
no O
small O
one O
escaping; O
the O
whole O
multitude O
upon O
the O
march O
being O
not O
less O
than O
forty O
thousand O
men. O
All O
carried O
anything O
they O
could O
which O
might O
be O
of O
use O
and O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
and O
troopers O
contrary O
to O
their O
wont O
while O
under O
arms O
carried O
their O
own O
victuals O
in O
some O
cases O
for O
want O
of O
servants O
in O
others O
through O
not O
trusting O
them; O
as O
they O
had O
long O
been O
deserting O
and O
now O
did O
so O
in O
greater O
numbers O
than O
ever. O
Yet O
even O
thus O
they O
did O
not O
carry O
enough O
as O
there O
was O
no O
longer O
food O
in O
the O
camp. O
Moreover O
their O
disgrace O
generally O
and O
the O
universality O
of O
their O
sufferings O
however O
to O
a O
certain O
extent O
alleviated O
by O
being O
borne O
in O
company O
were O
still O
felt O
at O
the O
moment O
a O
heavy O
burden O
especially O
when O
they O
contrasted O
the O
splendour O
and O
glory O
of O
their O
setting O
out O
with O
the O
humiliation O
in O
which O
it O
had O
ended. O
For O
this O
was O
by O
far O
the O
greatest O
reverse O
that O
ever O
befell O
an O
Hellenic O
army. O
They O
had O
come O
to O
enslave O
others O
and O
were O
departing O
in O
fear O
of O
being O
enslaved O
themselves O
they O
had O
sailed O
out O
with O
prayer O
and O
paeans O
and O
now O
started O
to O
go O
back O
with O
omens O
directly O
contrary; O
travelling O
by O
land O
instead O
of O
by O
sea O
and O
trusting O
not O
in O
their O
fleet O
but O
in O
their O
heavy O
infantry. O
Nevertheless O
the O
greatness O
of O
the O
danger O
still O
impending O
made O
all O
this O
appear O
tolerable. O
76Nicias O
seeing O
the O
army O
dejected O
and O
greatly O
altered O
passed O
along O
the O
ranks O
and O
encouraged O
and O
comforted O
them O
as O
far O
as O
was O
possible O
under O
the O
circumstances O
raising O
his O
voice O
still O
higher O
and O
higher O
as O
he O
went O
from O
one O
company O
to O
another O
in O
his O
earnestness O
and O
in O
his O
anxiety O
that O
the O
benefit O
of O
his O
words O
might O
reach O
as O
many O
as O
possible O
77"Athenians O
and O
allies O
even O
in O
our O
present O
position O
we O
must O
still O
hope O
on O
since O
men O
have O
ere O
now O
been O
saved O
from O
worse O
straits O
than O
this; O
and O
you O
must O
not O
condemn O
yourselves O
too O
severely O
either O
because O
of O
your O
disasters O
or O
because O
of O
your O
present O
unmerited O
sufferings. O
I O
myself O
who O
am O
not O
superior O
to O
any O
of O
you O
in O
strength O
indeed O
you O
see O
how O
I O
am O
in O
my O
sickness O
and O
who O
in O
the O
gifts O
of O
fortune O
am O
I O
think O
whether O
in O
private O
life O
or O
otherwise O
the O
equal O
of O
any O
am O
now O
exposed O
to O
the O
same O
danger O
as O
the O
meanest O
among O
you; O
and O
yet O
my O
life O
has O
been O
one O
of O
much O
devotion O
toward O
the O
gods O
and O
of O
much O
justice O
and O
without O
offence O
toward O
men. O
I O
have O
therefore O
still O
a O
strong O
hope O
for O
the O
future O
and O
our O
misfortunes O
do O
not O
terrify O
me O
as O
much O
as O
they O
might. O
Indeed O
we O
may O
hope O
that O
they O
will O
be O
lightened O
our O
enemies O
have O
had O
good O
fortune O
enough; O
and O
if O
any O
of O
the O
gods O
was O
offended O
at O
our O
expedition O
we O
have O
been O
already O
amply O
punished. O
Others O
before O
us O
have O
attacked O
their O
neighbours O
and O
have O
done O
what O
men O
will O
do O
without O
suffering O
more O
than O
they O
could O
bear; O
and O
we O
may O
now O
justly O
expect O
to O
find O
the O
gods O
more O
kind O
for O
we O
have O
become O
fitter O
objects O
for O
their O
pity O
than O
their O
jealousy. O
And O
then O
look O
at O
yourselves O
mark O
the O
numbers O
and O
efficiency O
of O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
marching O
in O
your O
ranks O
and O
do O
not O
give O
way O
too O
much O
to O
despondency O
but O
reflect O
that O
you O
are O
yourselves O
at O
once O
a O
city O
wherever O
you O
sit O
down O
and O
that O
there O
is O
no O
other O
in O
Sicily O
that O
could O
easily O
resist O
your O
attack O
or O
expel O
you O
when O
once O
established. O
The O
safety O
and O
order O
of O
the O
march O
is O
for O
yourselves O
to O
look O
to; O
the O
one O
thought O
of O
each O
man O
being O
that O
the O
spot O
on O
which O
he O
may O
be O
forced O
to O
fight O
must O
be O
conquered O
and O
held O
as O
his O
country O
and O
stronghold. O
Meanwhile O
we O
shall O
hasten O
on O
our O
way O
night O
and O
day O
alike O
as O
our O
provisions O
are O
scanty; O
and O
if O
we O
can O
reach O
some O
friendly O
place O
of O
the O
Sicels O
whom O
fear O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
still O
keeps O
true O
to O
us O
you O
may O
forthwith O
consider O
yourselves O
safe. O
A O
message O
has O
been O
sent O
on O
to O
them O
with O
directions O
to O
meet O
us O
with O
supplies O
of O
food. O
To O
sum O
up O
be O
convinced O
soldiers O
that O
you O
must O
be O
brave O
as O
there O
is O
no O
place O
near O
for O
your O
cowardice O
to O
take O
refuge O
in O
and O
that O
if O
you O
now O
escape O
from O
the O
enemy O
you O
may O
all O
see O
again O
what O
your O
hearts O
desire O
while O
those O
of O
you O
who O
are O
Athenians O
will O
raise O
up O
again O
the O
great O
power O
of O
the O
state O
fallen O
though O
it O
be. O
Men O
make O
the O
city O
and O
not O
walls O
or O
ships O
without O
men O
in O
them." O
78As O
he O
made O
this O
address O
Nicias O
went O
along O
the O
ranks O
and O
brought O
back O
to O
their O
place O
any O
of O
the O
troops O
that O
he O
saw O
straggling O
out O
of O
the O
line; O
while O
Demosthenes O
did O
as O
much O
for O
his O
part O
of O
the O
army O
addressing O
them O
in O
words O
very O
similar. O
The O
army O
marched O
in O
a O
hollow O
square O
the O
division O
under O
Nicias O
leading O
and O
that O
of O
Demosthenes O
following O
the O
heavy O
infantry O
being O
outside O
and O
the O
baggage O
carriers O
and O
the O
bulk O
of O
the O
army O
in O
the O
middle. O
When O
they O
arrived O
at O
the O
ford O
of O
the O
river O
Anapus O
there O
they O
found O
drawn O
up B-LOC
a O
body O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
allies O
and O
routing O
these O
made O
good O
their O
passage O
and O
pushed O
on O
harassed O
by O
the O
charges O
of O
the O
Syracusan O
horse O
and O
by O
the O
missiles O
of O
their O
light O
troops. O
On O
that O
day O
they O
advanced O
about O
four O
miles O
and O
a O
half O
halting O
for O
the O
night O
upon O
a O
certain O
hill. O
On O
the O
next O
they O
started O
early O
and O
got O
on O
about O
two O
miles O
further O
and O
descended O
into O
a O
place O
in O
the O
plain O
and O
there O
encamped O
in O
order O
to O
procure O
some O
eatables O
from O
the O
houses O
as O
the O
place O
was O
inhabited O
and O
to O
carry O
on O
with O
them O
water O
from O
thence O
as O
for O
many O
furlongs O
in O
front O
in O
the O
direction O
in O
which O
they O
were O
going O
it O
was O
not O
plentiful. O
The O
Syracusans O
meanwhile O
went O
on O
and O
fortified O
the O
pass O
in O
front O
where O
there O
was O
a O
steep O
hill O
with O
a O
rocky O
ravine O
on O
each O
side O
of O
it O
called O
the O
Acraean O
cliff. O
The O
next O
day O
the O
Athenians O
advancing O
found O
themselves O
impeded O
by O
the O
missiles O
and O
charges O
of O
the O
horse O
and O
darters O
both O
very O
numerous O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
allies; O
and O
after O
fighting O
for O
a O
long O
while O
at O
length O
retired O
to O
the O
same O
camp O
where B-PER
they O
had O
no O
longer O
provisions O
as O
before O
it O
being O
impossible O
to O
leave O
their O
position O
by O
reason O
of O
the O
cavalry. O
79Early O
next O
morning O
they O
started O
afresh O
and O
forced O
their O
way O
to O
the O
hill O
which O
had O
been O
fortified O
where O
they O
found O
before O
them O
the O
enemy's O
infantry O
drawn O
up B-PER
many I-PER
shields O
deep O
to O
defend O
the O
fortification O
the O
pass O
being O
narrow. O
The O
Athenians O
assaulted O
the O
work O
but O
were O
greeted O
by O
a O
storm O
of O
missiles O
from O
the O
hill O
which O
told O
with O
the O
greater O
effect O
through O
its O
being O
a O
steep O
one O
and O
unable O
to O
force O
the O
passage O
retreated O
again O
and O
rested. O
Meanwhile O
occurred O
some O
claps O
of O
thunder O
and O
rain O
as O
often O
happens O
towards O
autumn O
which O
still O
further O
disheartened O
the O
Athenians O
who O
thought O
all O
these O
things O
to O
be O
omens O
of O
their O
approaching O
ruin. O
While O
they O
were O
resting O
Gylippus O
and O
the O
Syracusans O
sent O
a O
part O
of O
their O
army O
to O
throw O
up O
works O
in O
their O
rear O
on O
the O
way O
by O
which O
they O
had O
advanced; O
however O
the O
Athenians O
immediately O
sent O
some O
of O
their O
men O
and O
prevented O
them; O
after O
which O
they O
retreated O
more O
towards O
the O
plain O
and O
halted O
for O
the O
night. O
When O
they O
advanced O
the O
next O
day O
the O
Syracusans O
surrounded O
and O
attacked O
them O
on O
every O
side O
and O
disabled O
many O
of O
them O
falling O
back O
if O
the O
Athenians O
advanced O
and O
coming O
on O
if O
they O
retired O
and O
in O
particular O
assaulting O
their O
rear O
in O
the O
hope O
of O
routing O
them O
in O
detail O
and O
thus O
striking O
a O
panic O
into O
the O
whole O
army. O
For O
a O
long O
while O
the O
Athenians O
persevered O
in O
this O
fashion O
but O
after O
advancing O
for O
four O
or O
five O
furlongs O
halted O
to O
rest O
in O
the O
plain O
the O
Syracusans O
also O
withdrawing O
to O
their O
own O
camp. O
80During O
the O
night O
Nicias O
and O
Demosthenes O
seeing O
the O
wretched O
condition O
of O
their O
troops O
now O
in O
want O
of O
every O
kind O
of O
necessary O
and O
numbers O
of O
them O
disabled O
in O
the O
numerous O
attacks O
of O
the O
enemy O
determined O
to O
light O
as O
many O
fires O
as O
possible O
and O
to O
lead O
off O
the O
army O
no O
longer O
by O
the O
same O
route O
as O
they O
had O
intended O
but O
towards O
the O
sea O
in O
the O
opposite O
direction O
to O
that O
guarded O
by O
the O
Syracusans. O
The O
whole O
of O
this O
route O
was O
leading O
the O
army O
not O
to O
Catana O
but O
to O
the O
other O
side O
of O
Sicily O
towards O
Camarina O
Gela O
and O
the O
other O
Hellenic O
and O
barbarian O
towns O
in O
that O
quarter. O
They O
accordingly O
lit O
a O
number O
of O
fires O
and O
set O
out O
by O
night. O
Now O
all O
armies O
and O
the O
greatest O
most O
of O
all O
are O
liable O
to O
fears O
and O
alarms O
especially O
when O
they O
are O
marching O
by O
night O
through O
an O
enemy's O
country O
and O
with O
the O
enemy O
near; O
and O
the O
Athenians O
falling O
into O
one O
of O
these O
panics O
the O
leading O
division O
that O
of O
Nicias O
kept O
together O
and O
got O
on O
a O
good O
way O
in O
front O
while O
that O
of O
Demosthenes O
comprising O
rather O
more O
than O
half O
the O
army O
got O
separated O
and O
marched O
on O
in O
some O
disorder. O
By O
morning O
however O
they O
reached O
the O
sea O
and O
getting O
into O
the O
Helorine O
road O
pushed O
on O
in O
order O
to O
reach O
the O
river O
Cacyparis O
and O
to O
follow O
the O
stream O
up O
through O
the O
interior O
where O
they O
hoped O
to O
be O
met O
by O
the O
Sicels O
whom O
they O
had O
sent O
for. O
Arrived O
at O
the O
river O
they O
found O
there O
also O
a O
Syracusan O
party O
engaged O
in O
barring O
the O
passage O
of O
the O
ford O
with O
a O
wall O
and O
a O
palisade O
and O
forcing O
this O
guard O
crossed O
the O
river O
and O
went O
on O
to O
another O
called O
the O
Erineus O
according O
to O
the O
advice O
of O
their O
guides. O
81Meanwhile O
when O
day O
came O
and O
the B-PER
Syracusans O
and O
allies O
found O
that O
the O
Athenians O
were O
gone O
most O
of O
them O
accused O
Gylippus O
of O
having O
let O
them O
escape O
on O
purpose O
and O
hastily O
pursuing O
by O
the O
road O
which O
they O
had O
no O
difficulty O
in O
finding O
that O
they O
had O
taken O
overtook O
them O
about O
dinner O
time. O
They O
first O
came O
up O
with O
the O
troops O
under O
Demosthenes O
who O
were O
behind O
and O
marching O
somewhat O
slowly O
and O
in O
disorder O
owing O
to O
the O
night O
panic O
above O
referred O
to O
and O
at O
once O
attacked O
and O
engaged O
them O
the O
Syracusan O
horse O
surrounding O
them O
with O
more O
ease O
now O
that O
they O
were O
separated O
from O
the O
rest O
and O
hemming O
them O
in O
on O
one O
spot. O
The O
division O
of O
Nicias O
was O
five O
or O
six O
miles O
on O
in O
front O
as O
he O
led O
them O
more O
rapidly O
thinking O
that O
under O
the O
circumstances O
their O
safety O
lay O
not O
in O
staying O
and O
fighting O
unless O
obliged O
but O
in O
retreating O
as O
fast O
as O
possible O
and O
only O
fighting O
when O
forced O
to O
do O
so. O
On O
the O
other O
hand O
Demosthenes O
was O
generally O
speaking O
harassed O
more O
incessantly O
as O
his O
post O
in O
the O
rear O
left O
him O
the O
first O
exposed O
to O
the O
attacks O
of O
the O
enemy; O
and O
now O
finding O
that O
the O
Syracusans O
were O
in O
pursuit O
he O
omitted O
to O
push O
on O
in O
order O
to O
form O
his O
men O
for O
battle O
and O
so O
lingered O
until O
he O
was O
surrounded O
by O
his O
pursuers O
and O
himself O
and O
the O
Athenians O
with O
him O
placed O
in O
the O
most O
distressing O
position O
being O
huddled O
into O
an O
enclosure O
with O
a O
wall O
all O
round O
it O
a O
road O
on O
this O
side O
and O
on O
that O
and O
olive O
trees O
in O
great O
number O
where O
missiles O
were O
showered O
in O
upon O
them O
from O
every O
quarter. O
This O
mode O
of O
attack O
the O
Syracusans O
had O
with O
good O
reason O
adopted O
in O
preference O
to O
fighting O
at O
close O
quarters O
as O
to O
risk O
a O
struggle O
with O
desperate O
men O
was O
now O
more O
for O
the O
advantage O
of O
the O
Athenians O
than O
for O
their O
own; O
besides O
their O
success O
had O
now O
become O
so O
certain O
that O
they O
began O
to O
spare O
themselves O
a O
little O
in O
order O
not O
to O
be O
cut O
off O
in O
the O
moment O
of O
victory O
thinking O
too O
that O
as O
it O
was O
they O
would O
be O
able O
in O
this O
way O
to O
subdue O
and O
capture O
the O
enemy. O
82In O
fact O
after O
plying O
the O
Athenians O
and O
allies O
all O
day O
long O
from O
every O
side O
with O
missiles O
they O
at O
length O
saw O
that O
they O
were O
worn O
out O
with O
their O
wounds O
and O
other O
sufferings; O
and O
Gylippus O
and O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
made O
a O
proclamation O
offering O
their O
liberty O
to O
any O
of O
the O
islanders O
who O
chose O
to B-PER
come O
over O
to O
them; O
and O
some O
few O
cities O
went O
over. O
Afterwards O
a O
capitulation O
was O
agreed O
upon O
for O
all O
the O
rest O
with O
Demosthenes O
to O
lay O
down O
their O
arms O
on O
condition O
that O
no O
one O
was O
to O
be O
put O
to O
death O
either O
by O
violence O
or O
imprisonment O
or O
want O
of O
the O
necessaries O
of O
life. O
Upon O
this O
they O
surrendered O
to O
the O
number O
of O
six O
thousand O
in O
all O
laying O
down O
all O
the O
money O
in O
their O
possession O
which O
filled O
the O
hollows O
of O
four O
shields O
and O
were O
immediately O
conveyed O
by O
the O
Syracusans O
to O
the O
town. O
83Meanwhile O
Nicias O
with O
his O
division O
arrived O
that O
day O
at O
the O
river O
Erineus O
crossed O
over O
and O
posted O
his O
army O
upon O
some O
high O
ground O
upon O
the O
other O
side. O
The O
next O
day O
the O
Syracusans O
overtook O
him O
and O
told O
him O
that O
the O
troops O
under O
Demosthenes O
had O
surrendered O
and O
invited O
him O
to O
follow O
their O
example. O
Incredulous O
of O
the O
fact O
Nicias O
asked O
for O
a O
truce O
to O
send O
a O
horseman O
to O
see O
and O
upon O
the O
return O
of O
the O
messenger O
with O
the O
tidings O
that O
they O
had O
surrendered O
sent O
a O
herald O
to O
Gylippus O
and O
the O
Syracusans O
saying O
that O
he O
was O
ready O
to O
agree O
with O
them O
on O
behalf O
of O
the O
Athenians O
to O
repay O
whatever O
money O
the O
Syracusans O
had O
spent O
upon O
the O
war O
if O
they O
would O
let O
his O
army O
go; O
and O
offered O
until O
the O
money O
was O
paid O
to O
give O
Athenians O
as O
hostages O
one O
for O
every O
talent. O
The O
Syracusans O
and O
Gylippus O
rejected O
this O
proposition O
and O
attacked O
this O
division O
as O
they O
had O
the O
other O
standing O
all O
round O
and O
plying O
them O
with O
missiles O
until O
the O
evening. O
Food O
and O
necessaries O
were O
as O
miserably O
wanting O
to O
the O
troops O
of O
Nicias O
as O
they O
had O
been O
to O
their O
comrades; O
nevertheless O
they O
watched O
for O
the O
quiet O
of O
the O
night O
to O
resume O
their O
march. O
But O
as O
they O
were O
taking O
up O
their O
arms O
the O
Syracusans O
perceived O
it O
and O
raised O
their O
paean O
upon O
which O
the O
Athenians O
finding O
that O
they O
were O
discovered O
laid O
them O
down O
again O
except O
about O
three O
hundred O
men O
who O
forced O
their O
way O
through O
the O
guards O
and O
went O
on O
during O
the O
night O
as O
they O
were O
able. O
84As O
soon O
as O
it O
was O
day O
Nicias O
put O
his O
army O
in O
motion O
pressed O
as O
before O
by O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
pelted O
from O
every O
side O
by O
their O
missiles O
and O
struck O
down O
by O
their O
javelins. O
The O
Athenians O
pushed O
on O
for O
the O
Assinarus O
impelled O
by B-PER
the I-PER
attacks O
made O
upon O
them O
from O
every O
side O
by O
a O
numerous O
cavalry O
and O
the O
swarm O
of O
other O
arms O
fancying O
that O
they O
should O
breathe O
more O
freely O
if O
once O
across O
the O
river O
and O
driven O
on O
also O
by O
their O
exhaustion O
and O
craving O
for O
water. O
Once O
there O
they O
rushed O
in O
and O
all O
order O
was O
at O
an O
end O
each O
man O
wanting O
to O
cross O
first O
and B-PER
the O
attacks O
of O
the O
enemy O
making O
it O
difficult O
to O
cross O
at O
all; O
forced O
to O
huddle O
together O
they O
fell O
against O
and O
trod O
down O
one O
another O
some O
dying O
immediately O
upon O
the O
javelins O
others O
getting O
entangled O
together O
and O
stumbling O
over O
the O
articles O
of O
baggage O
without O
being O
able O
to O
rise O
again. O
Meanwhile O
the O
opposite O
bank O
which O
was O
steep O
was O
lined O
by O
the O
Syracusans O
who O
showered O
missiles O
down O
upon O
the O
Athenians O
most O
of O
them O
drinking O
greedily O
and O
heaped O
together O
in O
disorder O
in O
the O
hollow O
bed O
of O
the O
river. O
The O
Peloponnesians O
also O
came O
down O
and O
butchered O
them O
especially O
those O
in O
the O
water O
which O
was O
thus O
immediately O
spoiled O
but O
which O
they O
went O
on O
drinking O
just O
the O
same O
mud B-PER
and I-PER
all O
bloody O
as O
it O
was O
most O
even O
fighting O
to O
have O
it. O
85At O
last O
when O
many O
dead O
now O
lay O
piled O
one O
upon O
another O
in O
the O
stream O
and O
part O
of O
the O
army O
had O
been O
destroyed O
at O
the O
river O
and O
the O
few O
that O
escaped O
from O
thence O
cut O
off O
by O
the O
cavalry O
Nicias O
surrendered O
himself O
to O
Gylippus O
whom O
he O
trusted O
more O
than O
he O
did O
the O
Syracusans O
and O
told O
him O
and O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
to O
do O
what O
they O
liked O
with O
him O
but O
to O
stop O
the O
slaughter O
of O
the O
soldiers. O
Gylippus B-PER
after O
this O
immediately O
gave O
orders O
to O
make O
prisoners; O
upon O
which O
the O
rest O
were O
brought O
together O
alive O
except O
a O
large O
number O
secreted O
by O
the O
soldiery O
and O
a O
party O
was O
sent O
in O
pursuit O
of O
the O
three O
hundred O
who O
had O
got O
through O
the O
guard O
during O
the O
night O
and O
who O
were O
now O
taken O
with O
the O
rest. O
The O
number O
of O
the O
enemy O
collected O
as O
public O
property O
was O
not O
considerable; O
but O
that O
secreted O
was O
very O
large O
and O
all O
Sicily O
was O
filled O
with O
them O
no O
convention O
having O
been O
made O
in O
their O
case O
as O
for O
those O
taken O
with O
Demosthenes. O
Besides O
this O
a O
large O
portion O
were O
killed O
outright O
the O
carnage O
being O
very O
great O
and O
not O
exceeded O
by O
any O
in O
this O
Sicilian O
war. O
In O
the O
numerous O
other O
encounters O
upon O
the O
march O
not O
a O
few O
also O
had O
fallen. O
Nevertheless O
many O
escaped O
some O
at O
the O
moment O
others O
served O
as O
slaves O
and O
then O
ran O
away O
subsequently. O
These O
found O
refuge O
at O
Catana. O
86The O
Syracusans O
and O
their O
allies O
now O
mustered O
and O
took O
up O
the O
spoils O
and O
as O
many O
prisoners O
as O
they O
could O
and O
went O
back O
to O
the O
city. O
The O
rest O
of O
their O
Athenian O
and O
allied O
captives O
were O
deposited O
in O
the O
quarries O
this O
seeming O
the O
safest O
way O
of O
keeping O
them; O
but O
Nicias O
and O
Demosthenes O
were O
butchered O
against O
the O
will O
of O
Gylippus O
who O
thought O
that O
it O
would O
be O
the O
crown O
of O
his O
triumph O
if O
he O
could O
take O
the O
enemy's O
generals O
to O
Lacedaemon. O
One O
of O
them O
as O
it O
happened O
Demosthenes O
was O
one O
of O
her O
greatest O
enemies O
on O
account O
of O
the O
affair O
of O
the O
island O
and O
of O
Pylos; O
while O
the O
other O
Nicias O
was O
for O
the O
same O
reasons O
one B-PER
of O
her O
greatest O
friends O
owing O
to O
his O
exertions O
to O
procure O
the O
release O
of O
the O
prisoners O
by O
persuading O
the O
Athenians O
to O
make O
peace. O
For O
these O
reasons O
the O
Lacedaemonians O
felt O
kindly O
towards O
him; O
and O
it O
was O
in O
this O
that O
Nicias O
himself O
mainly O
confided O
when O
he O
surrendered O
to O
Gylippus. O
But O
some O
of O
the O
Syracusans O
who O
had O
been O
in O
correspondence O
with O
him O
were O
afraid O
it O
was O
said O
of O
his O
being O
put O
to O
the O
torture O
and O
troubling O
their O
success O
by O
his O
revelations; O
others O
especially O
the O
Corinthians O
of O
his O
escaping O
as O
he O
was O
wealthy O
by O
means O
of O
bribes O
and O
living O
to O
do O
them O
further O
mischief; O
and O
these O
persuaded O
the O
allies O
and O
put B-LOC
him I-LOC
to O
death. O
This O
or O
the O
like O
was O
the O
cause O
of O
the O
death O
of O
a O
man O
who O
of O
all O
the O
Hellenes O
in O
my O
time O
least O
deserved O
such O
a O
fate O
seeing O
that O
the O
whole O
course O
of O
his O
life O
had O
been O
regulated O
with O
strict O
attention O
to O
virtue. O
87The O
prisoners O
in O
the O
quarries O
were O
at O
first O
hardly O
treated O
by O
the O
Syracusans. O
Crowded O
in O
a O
narrow O
hole O
without O
any O
roof O
to O
cover O
them O
the O
heat O
of O
the O
sun O
and O
the O
stifling O
closeness O
of O
the O
air O
tormented O
them O
during O
the O
day O
and O
then O
the O
nights O
which O
came O
on O
autumnal O
and O
chilly O
made O
them O
ill O
by O
the O
violence O
of O
the O
change; O
besides O
as O
they O
had O
to O
do O
everything O
in O
the O
same O
place O
for O
want O
of O
room O
and O
the O
bodies O
of O
those O
who O
died O
of O
their O
wounds O
or O
from O
the O
variation O
in O
the O
temperature O
or B-PER
from I-PER
similar O
causes O
were O
left O
heaped O
together O
one O
upon O
another O
intolerable O
stenches O
arose; O
while O
hunger O
and O
thirst O
never O
ceased O
to O
afflict O
them O
each O
man O
during O
eight O
months O
having O
only O
half O
a O
pint O
of O
water O
and O
a O
pint O
of O
corn O
given O
him O
daily. O
In O
short O
no O
single O
suffering O
to O
be O
apprehended O
by O
men O
thrust O
into O
such O
a O
place O
was O
spared O
them. O
For O
some O
seventy O
days O
they O
thus O
lived O
all O
together O
after O
which O
all O
except O
the O
Athenians O
and O
any O
Siceliots O
or O
Italiots O
who O
had O
joined O
in O
the O
expedition O
were O
sold. O
The O
total O
number O
of O
prisoners O
taken O
it O
would O
be O
difficult O
to O
state O
exactly O
but B-PER
it O
could O
not O
have O
been O
less O
than O
seven O
thousand. O
This O
was O
the O
greatest O
Hellenic O
achievement O
of O
any O
in O
this O
war O
or O
in O
my O
opinion O
in O
Hellenic O
history; O
at O
once O
most O
glorious O
to O
the O
victors O
and O
most O
calamitous O
to O
the O
conquered. O
They O
were O
beaten O
at O
all O
points O
and O
altogether; O
all O
that O
they O
suffered O
was O
great; O
they O
were O
destroyed O
as O
the O
saying O
is O
with O
a O
total O
destruction O
their O
fleet O
their O
army O
everything O
was O
destroyed O
and O
few O
out O
of O
many O
returned O
home. O
Such O
were O
the O
events O
in O
Sicily. O